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POSTMODERN* "PROGRESS": RECONSIDERING THE
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT POWER
Margaret Chon**
Most of us carry in our heart[s] the Jocasta who begs Oedipus for God's
sake not to inquire further.'
As a strategic and emotional matter, I really am hostile to the Oedipal ac-
counts and their mutants - not because I don't recognize their power but
because I am too convinced of their power.'
INTRODUCTION - OR WHY BE TRENDY?
Knowledge, as Oedipus discovered, can be destructive. Yet it also
can be liberating. An idea is the ultimate renewable resource: we
gain from Jocasta's (if not Jane's) pain. Like a perpetual motion
machine, the force of an idea is undiminished by the number of
times it is considered. Nor does being considered simultaneously by
more than one person deprive an idea of its power. To the contrary,
an idea's influence grows by being considered more than one time or
* Even before the author is identified, she acknowledges trepidation at applying the modifier
"postmodern" to anything - not least to the subject of intellectual property protection of
computer technology, which is intimidating enough even without the aid of abstruse French terms
such as "diff6rance." The first epigraph will remind us, however, that ignoring something will not
make it go away. Moreover, communications technology is largely responsible for our postmodern
condition, and turn about is fair play: it seems appropriate to apply the insights of both the theory
of postmodernism and the condition of postmodernity to the subject of technology.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. A.B., Cornell University
1979; M.H.S.A., J.D., The University of Michigan 1981, 1986. I appreciate the comments on
earlier drafts of this article from Daan Braveman, Robin Paul Malloy, Jessica Litman, Janis L.
McDonald, and William M. Wiecek. As well, I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of
Cindy M. Monaco, Stewart A. Pollock, and Alana N. Grice. All truth claims are those of the
author. This article is dedicated to the real Ted Diamond.
1. Letter from Schopenhauer to Goethe, quoted in DIANE WOOD MIDDLEBROOK, ANNE SEX-
TON: A BIOGRAPHY 101 (1991) The quotation is the basis for the title of Sexton's poem, "For
John, Who Begs Me Not to Enquire Further": "Not that it was beautiful,/ but that, in the end,
there was/ a certain sense of order there;/ something worth learning. ... ANNE SEXTON, SE-
LECTED POEMS OF ANNE SEXTON 26 (Diane Wood Middlebrook & Diana Hume George eds.,
1988).
2. Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway, TECHNOCULTURE 9 (Constance Penley &
Andrew Ross eds., 1991) [hereinafter Cyborgs at Large].
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by more than one person, and the consideration of an idea by others
will lead to new ideas. Furthermore, the reflexivity of knowledge -
that is, its capacity to influence human social practices, which in
turn influence knowledge production - is a pervasive characteristic
of our epoch of high modernity.3 Tiresias guides us in the late twen-
tieth century.4
What then is the mandate for Congress's copyright and patent
power - its power with respect to knowledge? 5 Intellectual prop-
erty scholars have not had the furious debates over original intent
that have racked the ranks of constitutional law scholars over such
topics, for example, as the Reconstruction amendments.6 Moreover,
because of the instrumental tone of the Copyright and Patent
Clause ("to promote the Progress . . . by securing"), no one truly
disputes that such "Progress" is to be encouraged through the
frankly instrumental use of laws. Thus, despite persistent undercur-
rents of natural law analysis,7 Lochner v. New York8 does not loom
large in the intellectual property arena and most intellectual prop-
erty scholars do not employ the rhetoric of fundamental rights or
liberties. Some have posited that "Progress" is best promoted
through market competition,9 while others have found in the patent
3. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 39 (1990) ("We are abroad in
a world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but where at the
same time we can never be sure that any given element of that knowledge will not be revised.").
4. See Ren6 Girard, Tiresias and the Critic, in THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY: THE LAN-
GUAGES OF CRITICISM AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN 15 (Richard Macksey & Eugenio Donato eds.,
1972).
5. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 1 use the term "intellectual property law(s)" throughout this article to denote this
particular constitutional text as well as the statutes and cases dealing with it. It can (but for my
present purposes does not) include federal trademark law, which rests on Congress's commerce
power, the Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), and state law concerning trade secrets or unfair
competition.
6. See Denis J. Brion, Performing the Constitution, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 293 (1992)
(arguing that the constitution must be performed rather than canonized); William M. Wiecek,
The Constitutional Snipe Hunt, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 253 (1992) (also arguing that the constitution
must be performed).
7. See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967);
Michael Davis, Patents, Natural Rights, and Natural Property, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION: VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES 241 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper
eds., 1989) [hereinafter "Weil & Snapper"]; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor
and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state labor law on substantive due process grounds),
overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV.
[Vol. 43:97
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and copyright clause a mandate for innovation.10 The courts have
relied on these two main justificatory strands in intellectual property
law through an ill-defined and dichotomous "incentive v. monopoly"
paradigm. This doctrinal balancing test pits the encouragement pro-
vided to "Authors" and "Inventors" by the grant of limited rights
against the dangers to the marketplace should those rights be over-
extended into quasi-monopolies. 1' Innovation is aided by the former;
competition hindered by the latter. 2 It is important, however, to re-
call that the actual constitutional text does not explicitly state these
policies, nor do we have the benefit of extended contemporaneous
accounts by the Framers of the Constitution to guide us in our
thinking.'" In addition, it is not even altogether clear why "Pro-
gress" is ultimately desirable. Thus the relationship of "Progress" to
values embedded within the Constitution deserves serious thought.
We can infer from the term "Progress of Science and useful
Arts" an Enlightenment faith in knowledge, whether it be knowl-
edge for its own sake or for other ends. Indeed, the existing meta-
narratives of intellectual property law draw heavily, both in style
and in substance, from the intellectual tradition of the Enlighten-
ment. This tradition - what I will call throughout this article the
modernist tradition"' - accords "Progress" a privileged' 5 concep-
873 (1971) (discussing a constitutional mandate for a competitive economy and its relationship to
federal and state law monopolies).
10. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (analyzing the proper scope of an experimen-
tal use exemption from patent infringement liability); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (examining the public domain in copyright law via the gulf between what
authors actually do and the way the law perceives them).
11. See, e.g., Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986)
("The rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection beyond the literal computer code,
would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most valuable efforts,
while not giving them a stranglehold over the development of new computer devices that accom-
plish the same end.").
12. Pamela Samuelson specifically characterizes this as a "tension that exists in intellectual
property law between the interests of innovators and the interests of competitors. ... Pamela
Samuelson, Innovation and Competition: Conflicts over Intellectual Property Rights in New
Technologies, in Weil & Snapper, supra note 7, at 169. Other less commonly accepted justifica-
tions for intellectual property laws include the exchange-for-secrecy rationale, the quality-control
principle, and the prospecting theory. These justifications are summarized in Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, General Overview of the Intellectual Property System, in Weil & Snapper, supra note
7, at 17, 19-20.
13. The rather terse discussion of the intellectual property clause in THE FEDERALIST No. 43
(James Madison) is discussed in section III infra. For the relevant text, see 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 40 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Kurland &
Lerner].
14. For purposes of this article, modernism is defined as a world view or cognitive framework
1993]
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tual status. Even this modernist tradition has not been mined com-
pletely for insights into the copyright and patent clause, however,
for the standard legal interpretations of this clause have maintained
a cheery and uncritical trust in "Progress" that ignores "the dark
side of reason." 16 Turned on itself, reason inevitably confronts its
own limits as a perceptual framework; the products of critical
thought are themselves always subject to critique. But it is the
postmodern critiques of the assumptions of modernism that most di-
rectly confront our Enlightenment-based romance with "Progress".
A postmodern view of "Progress" rejects the view of "Progress" as a
liberating upward trajectory. 17 A postmodernist asks in a much
more insistent tone than a modernist: What is the nature of the
"Progress" that is being promoted? And to what end? How does
postmodernism really help us better understand the copyright and
patent power (or as stated in the title to this section, "Why be
trendy?")? I am not suggesting an analysis that would "turn[] every
copyright [and patent] case into a mini-Marbury v. Madison"18 or
performance art. Rather, I believe the multiple perspectives of
based on "ego-centered reason [that] affirms the validity of the rule of reason as determined by
the individual rationalist self." Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67
TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1210-1I (1989) [hereinafter Schlag, Missing Pieces]. Schlag and others con-
trast modernism with rationalism. According to Schlag, modernism differs from rationalism in
that "[t]he rationalist ... allows the ego to stand outside of the inquiry and adjudicate the valid-
ity of the statement in the court of individual consciousness [whereas the] modernist relinquishes
this philosophical idealism and stands inside." Id. at 1215. I focus on their shared characteristics
and therefore collapse the two categories into the modernist label.
15. "Privileged" is a postmodernist's term of art. It springs from the idea that "binary opposi-
tions are pervasive in and undergird Western thinking and language. When we think or write
about something, we do so assuming certain dichotomies, with one pole of the opposition dominat-
ing the other." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for
Statutory Construction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2525 (1992). The dominant pole is the "privi-
leged" pole. While certain privileged poles have been explicitly challenged by various legal theo-
ries (e.g., "male" by feminist legal scholars; "objective" by critical theorists of all stripes; "public"
by a variety of scholars, including constitutional law scholars), "Progress" seems to be privileged
across a spectacularly wide spectrum of ideological and methodological viewpoints.
16. Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 14, at 1218. Freud, for example, while trained in the
Enlightenment tradition, recognized that the individual is not purely self-directing and rational
but is motivated in part by her or his unconscious. By undermining the Enlightenment assumption
of a wholly rational subject, he also contributed to the late modernist recognition of limits to the
liberating power of reason and ultimately to the postmodernist death of the subject.
17. See GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 177 ("Many of the phenomena often labeled as post-modern
[sic] actually concern the experience of living in a world in which presence and absence mingle in
historically novel ways. Progress becomes emptied of content as the circularity of modernity takes
hold. ... ).
18. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1440 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993) (arguing that copyright law should not
be constitutionalized).
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postmodernism help us to appreciate at least three broad prescrip-
tions. The overall theme implied in these three items is that of stew-
ardship - that the encouragement of knowledge production and
knowledge deployment via the copyright and patent power is in the
nature of a trust, of which the beneficiary is not just the American
people or even human beings worldwide, but Gaia and all its inhabi-
tants.1 9 First, postmodern "Progress" deconstructs2" the linear and
forward nature of "Progress" (postmodern progress is circular, side-
ways, or even upside-down), thus accommodating calls for limits to
growth such as the biologically-based sustainable development
movement." It also articulates the saturating, self-propagating, and
iterative process of knowledge production, thus exposing the trustee
role of Congress and the courts to the res of knowledge.2
Postmodern "Progress" also recognizes the "global village ' 23 phe-
nomenon caused by the exponential increase in technological con-
centration and infiltration, thus highlighting both the need for distri-
19. See EDWARD 0. WILSON. THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 272, 346-348 (1992) (discussing man's
stewardship role in sustaining biodiversity).
20. "Deconstruct" is another favorite postmodern term of art, one also employed by modernists
with "progress"ive politics. It means to:
reconfigur[e] and reconstruct[] a dichotomy and, in the process, demonstrat[e] that a
text can be read to assert a different thesis or convey a different meaning from those
it had been commonly assumed to assert or convey. The text can be said to contain
both a thesis and its antithesis. This reconfiguration of a binary opposition is done not
by dreaming up various bizarre arguments or interpretations, but by laying bare alter-
native understandings of the dichotomy through the words of the text itself or implicit
assumptions underlying those words.
Schanck, supra note 15, at 2527 (discussing the works of Jacques Derrida).
21. The concept of sustainable development is not fixed, but the following definition captures
most of its qualities:
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable - to ensure that it meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits -- not
absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social
organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb
the effects of human activities.
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987)
[hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government recommended that long-term science and technology goals necessarily include the
"sustainable use of resources." CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERN-
MENT, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT FOR A CHANGING WORLD 70 (Apr. 1993)
(concluding report).
22. As discussed in section II below, the public trust of information is maximized when innova-
tors in the computer software industry concede to certain public interests embodied in the compat-
ibility of computer systems developed by second-comers. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 26.
23. This term was first coined in MARSHALL MCLUHAN & BRUCE R. POWERS, THE GLOBAL
VILLAGE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (1968).
1993]
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butional fairness of and decentralized control over knowledge, both
within developing countries and between the developing and devel-
oped nations.24
A postmodern "Progress," then, would not simply be the increas-
ing recognition of a plurality of claims and meanings, as some have
described pure postmodern theory,2 5 but would also be consistent
with advancing certain normative themes. 6 To express the idea of
stewardship, knowledge can be visualized as a natural resource com-
mons, such as air or water, which is held in a public trust.27 Such a
public trust of information, upon which our interconnected lives
must draw freely and which must be managed with extreme care by
Congress and the courts, is an important yet highly undeveloped ele-
ment of intellectual property law. Throughout this article, I will re-
fer in shorthand to this concept of a public trust over a commons of
information resources as the "Progress project." An alternative for-
mulation of the "Progress" project is that all persons (not just au-
thors and inventors) have a stake in - what could be termed a
fundamental right of access to - this trust. This right is more ba-
24. See C.G. Weeramantry, Human Rights, Technology, and Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 151 (C.G. Weeramantry ed., 1990). Those
in the developing world express this need as the "right to development," which includes a right to
choose and control as well as enjoy technology. Id. Cf. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN. THE MEDIA MONOP-
OLY 223 (3d ed. 1990) ("To give citizens a choice in ideas, and information is to give them a
choice in politics: if a nation has narrowly controlled information, it will soon have narrowly con-
trolled politics.").
25. Christopher Norris points out that this "free-for-all attitude of hermeneutic license that
often gets mistaken for 'deconstruction' by friends and enemies alike" is refuted by a close reading
of the works of the founding fathers of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man. Chris-
topher Norris, Law, Deconstruction, and the Resistance to Theory, 15 J.L. & Soc'Y 166, 174
(1988). See also PAULINE M ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS,
INROADS. AND INTRUSIONS 15-16, 111 (1992) (comparing "skeptical" postmodernism with "af-
firmative" postmodernism).
26. Pierre Schlag critiques the colonialization of postmodernism by rationalist forms and prac-
tices, and argues that even postmodern legal academics never acknowledge the privileged position
of normativity in their own legal writings. Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The
Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, II CARDOZO L. REv. 1631, 1636
(1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 847 (1991).
However, normative legal writing is really all academic lawyers have in common anymore. See
Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 889, 903-04 (1992) ("The purpose of legal scholarship is most accurately described as pre-
scription, or recommendation. . . . The entire field crackles with normativity, and it is this charac-
teristic that renders the scientific concept of validity so unhelpful as a basis for evaluation."). This
commonality of normativity, to me, is an important reason to keep (and privilege) it, regardless of
the fact that judges seem to be paying less and less attention to professors.
27. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (arguing that the public trust doctrine vests a legal
right to resources in the general public, a right which the government has a duty to protect).
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sic, as a constitutional matter, than the provision of incentives to
authors and inventors.
Postmodern "Progress" finally causes us to reconsider the free-
dom component of the "Progress" project. This component has been
obscured by the modernist tradition's emphasis on sheer economic
growth as a liberating force and even by critiques of that emphasis.
Whether through economic theory or critical theory, modernists
strive toward a utopian flame fueled by the increasing control of our
natural and social world through the acquisition and manipulation
of knowledge. Postmodernists, however, claim that increasing
knowledge does not necessarily correspond to increasing control but
merely to the reflexivity of knowledge.2" Moreover, this type of
"Progress," conceived in the Enlightenment fusion of religion with
science, insufficiently accounts for the fragile interdependence of all
living things in the biosphere - something that biologists (admit-
tedly trained squarely within the modernist tradition) attempt to
bring to the attention of those in the other physical and human sci-
ences."9 This biological interdependence functions also as a meta-
phor for our social interdependence in the global village. What was
missing throughout the modernist tradition until rather recently was
the yellow light: caution about our ability to fashion a better world
through direct knowledge manipulation per se.a° In challenging the
modernist tradition's direct causal equation, " 'Progress' of knowl-
edge = progress," postmodernism causes us to reexamine the basic
building blocks of our human liberty.
Part I of this article demonstrates the relative paucity of our con-
ventional modernist understanding of the copyright and patent
power by analyzing the rhetoric of recent decisions in the area of
computer copyright law. Part II then compares the modern and
28. GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 43-44.
29. Modernist "Progress" has increasingly severed human beings from the biological basis for
our existence and inserted us into environments shaped by communications technology. Hence,
one defining characteristic of postmodernity is that we are all products of a consumer culture or
information society. Id. at 1-2. But it does not free us from biological constraints on our existence.
WILSON. supra note 19, at 347.
30. Vaclav Havel writes:
The past era has taught us, survivors of the totalitarian regime, one very good lesson
- man cannot command wind and rain . . . . Man is not an omnipotent master of
the universe, allowed to do with impunity whatever he thinks, or whatever suits him
at the moment. The world we live in is made of an immensely complex and mysteri-
ous tissue about which we know very little and which we must treat with utmost
humility.
Vaclav Havel, Rio and the New Millennium, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at A21.
19931
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postmodern views of "Progress." The first half of Part II traces the
modernist concept of "Progress"; the second half describes the
postmodern insistence that grand narratives such as "Progress" are
self-deluding and examines the various normative programs tenta-
tively suggested by a postmodern reading of "Progress." Part III
articulates a right of access to knowledge that is a more fundamen-
tal constitutional mandate than that of providing incentives. Various
writings of James Madison (who introduced the patent and copy-
right clause in the Constitutional convention) and Thomas Jefferson
(who was the one of the first patent commissioners) indicate that
property inheres in the first instance in an individual's freedom to
use the knowledge of others rather than an individual's freedom to
exclude others from the use of knowledge. These texts, associated
strongly with Enlightenment thought, ironically link the seemingly
irreconcilable modern and postmodern takes on "Progress." The
"Progress" project then can be read more explicitly against a back-
drop of access to knowledge as a fundamental right.
II. THE MISSING PROJECT OF PROGRESS: A RHETORICAL
ANALYSIS
Courts interpreting the copyright and patent clause do not read
the language of incentives against a background of individual rights
of access to knowledge. Yet textual evidence suggests that the incen-
tives provided by copyrights and patents are only second-order con-
cerns which serve a higher purpose - the "Progress" project -
which preserves and nurtures a commons of knowledge. When
courts find that a particular slice of knowledge is not covered by a
copyright or patent, their opinions seem unable to name the "Pro-
gress" project. The denial of property rights in knowledge is often
accompanied by a rhetorical omission, as if it is almost counterintui-
tive to suggest that the "Progress" of knowledge is furthered by a
finding of no copyright or patent right.
For example, the Supreme Court itself has inconsistently stated
that the primary purpose of the patent and copyright clause is not to
provide authors and inventors with incentives but rather to "pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'" In other words, the
. 31. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., I II S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429-30 (1984); Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). But see BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 9 ("[Lleading Supreme Court deci-
[Vol. 43:97
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provision of incentives to authors and inventors will not always coin-
cide with the underlying objectives of that clause. Yet how are we to
know when "Progress" is disserved by a grant of copyright or
patent?
Congress has addressed this question by codifying certain legal
standards that must be met before a copyright or patent is granted,
and that presumably are indicia (however rough) of the promotion
of "Progress." Thus, a work must be original before a copyright can
issue, both in the sense of having some degree of originality and
being original to the author applying for the copyright.3 2 Moreover,
a naked idea, no matter how original, does not suffice for protection;
a copyright protects only an original expressive component of the
idea. 33 Similarly, before a patent can issue to an inventor, the inven-
tion must meet the statutory requirements of utility, " novelty,3 5 and
non-obviousness.3 Furthermore, under both the Copyright Act of
1976 and the Patent Act, 37 certain statutory subject matter is ex-
cluded from protection altogether.38 Taken together, these statutory
requirements are rough proxies for the constitutional mandate that
only knowledge that contributes to the sum of human knowledge is
accorded the status of property.
But these statutes are only the first cuts at defining protectable
knowledge. For example, statutory subject matter is not self-evident.
Whether patents should issue for mathematical algorithms as a type
of "process" has been a point of controversy between the Court of
sions for at least a century have held that the United States patent laws are primarily intended to
provide inventors with a 'stimulus,' 'inducement,' 'incentive,' 'encouragement,' or 'stimulation' to
further discoveries.").
In this section of the article, I will use "idea" ag a copyright law term of art; that is, the
unprotectable core of a "writing." In other sections of this article, I will treat "idea" in its more
general usage to denote a slice of knowledge or a concept.
32. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
33. Id. § 102(b).
34. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
35. Id. §§ 101-102.
36. Id. § 103.
37. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376
(1988).
38. In the case of copyrights, for example, the "102(b) exceptions" provide that no copyright
protection is available for an "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery." Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Analogously, patents
cannot be granted unless the invention falls into one of four categories: "process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter." Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Thus the patentability of
mathematical algorithms or formulae has always been, and continues to be, problematic.
19931
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. 9 The ques-
tions of whether copyright protection should extend to computer
software, and to different aspects of computer software such as ob-
ject code,4 screen displays, or program structure, continue to give
many courts pause.4'
In addition, even the per se existence of a statutorily valid copy-
right or patent is not conclusive proof that the copyright or patent
"promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts." In the area of
copyright law, courts have developed doctrines that differentiate be-
tween the validity and the scope of copyright protection. A work
with a scanty expressive component, such as a computer-generated
telephone directory, or one with many utilitarian features, such as a
computer program, can have a thin, as opposed to broad, scope of
copyright protection.4" The scope of defenses, such as fair use in
copyright law or the equitable defense of misuse in patent law is
similarly accordion-like.43 When ascertaining whether the underly-
ing goals of copyright or patent law are furthered by the grant of a
copyright or patent, courts often base their judgments on a balance
39. Until Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (granting a patent for a process of curing
synthetic rubber, even though the process utilized a specific mathematical formula), the Supreme
Court consistently reversed the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (and that court's prede-
cessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) on the issue of patentability of algorithms. See
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (denying a patent for an invention that relied on a mathe-
matical formula); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (denying a patent for an algorithm
that converted binary decimal numbers to binary numbers). Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent in
Diehr summarizes this battle. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. A computer code is equivalent to a written text. A code is a set of written instructions to
the computer expressed in binary form as a series of "Os" and "Is". Object codes are composed of
machine instructions, and are compiled or assembled from source codes, which are more easily
interpretable by humans.
41. A trio of Third Circuit cases supports this claim. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) ("structure, sequence, and organization" is protectable); Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (object code is
protectable); Williams Elecs. v. Artic. Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (screen displays are
protectable).
42. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991) (finding
that in a case involving telephone directory "the copyright in a factual compilation is thin.");
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding
unprotectable functional elements of spreadsheet program, such as rotated "L" screen display and
use of the forward slash key ("/") to invoke the menus); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Com-
mercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1868
(1990) ("the scope of copyright protection in an informational work may be quite scanty.").
43. For example, compare the court of appeals opinion in Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding the defense of fair use appropriate), to the district court
opinion in the same case, Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (finding the fair use defense inappropriate).
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between the benefits of providing authors and inventors with an "in-
centive" and the negative effects of a "monopoly" on certain
information."
However, this "incentive or monopoly" test is profoundly impov-
erished regarding the larger "Progress" project. The values underly-
ing the refusal to designate any particular snippet of knowledge as
protectable property are largely invisible. For instance, in Feist Pub-
lications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc.,"5 the Supreme Court
suggested that the overall purpose of the copyright and patent
clause is simply to "advance[] the progress of science and art."4
From this statement, it seems that mere accumulation of knowledge
is the only significant constitutional concern. A few years earlier,
the Court had stated that an "important public purpose [of both a
copyright and a patent] ...is . . .to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the lim-
ited period of exclusive control has expired. 47 This formulation
seems to make the incentive or monopoly test into a constitutional
requirement. The public's interest in the "free flow of ideas, infor-
mation, and commerce" 48 is not more fundamental than the incen-
tive to authors and inventors; rather, it competes with it.
Recent opinions in the computer copyright area mirror the Su-
preme Court's lack of vision with respect to the larger "Progress"
project.49 Various courts of appeals have had difficulty expressing
the concept that knowledge should be kept in a trust that is publicly
accessible. One example of this difficulty is the Second Circuit's
opinion in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc."°
The Altai court faced an elusive issue: whether a computer pro-
gram's non-literal elements (aspects of a computer program that are
44. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[W]e must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and
productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote
learning, culture and development.").
45. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
46. Id. at 1290. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (stating, "Innova-
tion, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in
a patent system which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of ...useful
Arts.' ").
47. Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
48. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
49. See infra notes 50-87 and accompanying text (discussing cases in this area).
50. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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not code)51 could receive copyright protection. The 1976 Copyright
Act provides virtually no guidance on this question, either by way of
direct statutory language or legislative history. 2 Direct copying of a
code would be an infringement of the plaintiff's copyright 53 for two
reasons: (1) Congress clearly wanted to protect some aspect of com-
puter software; 54 and (2) computer code is analogous to a literary
work (a category of work of authorship protected under the Copy-
right Act of 197655) such as a book. But the defendant Altai had
taken great pains to ensure the new code was created independently
of the plaintiff's code, although the underlying structures of the two
programs were similar.56 Independent creations, even if identical to
the copyrighted work, are not actionable. The Altai court thus had
to decide whether the plaintiff's program structure was
51. Code, as explained above, is language. See supra note 40. Non-literal elements can include
the "general flow charts as well as the more specific organization of inter-modular relationships,
parameter lists, and macros. In addition . . . the list of services that [the program] . . . obtain[s]
from [its] respective operating system[]." AItai, 982 F.2d at 702.
52. Legislative history to the Copyright Act contains only two brief references to the question
of copyright protection of computer technology. See HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 57
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 23-24 (1980). Congress delayed the
enactment of provisions relating to the protection of computers in the 1976 Act; instead, it ap-
pointed the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU") to study the question of whether computer technology should be protected by copy-
right. Courts frequently cite to the Final Report of this Commission as a type of legislative history
to the 1980 amendments. UNITED STATES. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT]. The CONTU
REPORT is silent on the question of whether program structure is protectable by copyright.
53. The district court in AItai found a copyright infringement of an earlier version of the pro-
gram on appeal. Altai, 982 F.2d at 700-01. Unbeknownst to defendant Altai, a former employee
of the plaintiff, who had come to work for Altai, had purposely copied the plaintiff's code when
developing the earliest version of Altai's program. Id. at 699-700. Upon discovery of the infringe-
ment, Altai developed a newer version of the program that purged all of the copied elements from
plaintiff's program. Id. at 700. Although plaintiff sought to recover for infringements involving
both programs, the District Court found infringement only with regard to Altai's original pro-
gram. Id. at 701..
54. Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 was amended in 1980 to include a definition of a
computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." Act of Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). Congress also amended § 117 of
the Act to include a "computer fair use" provision. Id. at 3028-29 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 117 (1988)).
55. Section 102 provides: "Subject matter of copyright: In general . . . [w]orks of authorship
include the following categories: (1) literary works. ... Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1988).
56. Altai, 982 F.2d at 700. The decision whether to afford copyright protection to non-literal
elements of a computer program is also significant because the same program can be written in
different languages; protection of literal code only would not prevent this type of copying.
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protectable.57
The Third Circuit had previously held, in Whelan Associates v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory,58 that certain non-literal elements of
computer software were protectable by copyright. 59 The Third Cir-
cuit's test was widely criticized because it protected practically
every aspect of a computer program besides its purpose (which the
court equated to a non-protectable "idea").60 The Altai court, by
contrast, opted for a less protective test, the "abstraction-filtration-
comparison" test, and ultimately decided that none of the non-literal
elements of plaintiff's program merited copyright protection. 6
What is of interest here is not the doctrinal difference between
the Third Circuit's test and that of the Second Circuit, but instead
the absence of language and concepts with which the Second Circuit
could justify its refusal to accord copyright protection to the knowl-
edge embodied in program structure. The opinion is profoundly de-
void of persuasive reasons to keep the program structure accessible,
although the court clearly wanted to reason in that direction. For
example, the Altai court whittled away at the property right
through what it called a "filtration" step, which is basically an as-
signment of presumptively protected expressive aspects of the pro-
gram back to the commons of unprotected knowledge.62 Part of the
court's filtration test was based on the concept of the public domain,
a term that has come to mean non-appropriable knowledge.63 With
respect to knowledge in the public domain, the court stated:
Such material' is free for the taking and cannot be appropriated by a single
author even though it is included in a copyrighted work. We see no reason
to make an exception to this rule for elements of a computer program that
have entered the public domain by virtue of freely accessible program ex-
changes and the like. 4
57. Altai, 982 F.2d at 702.
58. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1248.
60. The test was based on the assumption that computer programs have one idea, and that
everything else is expression (and hence protectable by copyright). Altai. 982 F.2d at 705.
61. Id. at 706-11, 715. The "abstraction-filtration comparison" test involves a three-part analy-
sis. First, the court examines the computer program's structure and isolates each separate idea. Id.
at 706-7. Next, the court filters out of the remaining expression all non-protectable knowledge.
The court then compares the filtered program structure to the infringing program structure, to
ascertain whether the two structures are substantially similar. Id. at 707.
62. Id. at 708-10.
63. Litman, supra note 10, at 967 ("the current trend is to characterize material in the public
domain as unprotectable or uncopyrightable.").
64. Altai, 982 F.2d at 710 (citations omitted).
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But the court never discussed the crucial question of why certain
knowledge is kept within the public domain and is therefore inap-
propriable, nor does it describe (except by a throw-away reference
to program exchanges) how one determines whether a bit of knowl-
edge is in the public domain.6 5 The public domain is simply one of'
three prongs of the filtration test, and its nurturance is not consid-
ered to be a crucial policy factor.66
Under the section of the opinion entitled "Policy Considerations,"
the strongest statement the Altai court could make was that, "The
interest of the copyright law is not in simply conferring a monopoly
on industrious persons, but in advancing the public welfare through
rewarding artistic creativity, in a manner that permits the free use
and development of non-protectable ideas and processes."67 This
formulation of the policies underlying copyright law begins with the
presumption of protectability, for it is only after a chunk of knowl-
edge is deemed "non-protectable" that its free use is permitted. The
term "public welfare" is linked to "rewarding artistic creativity."
By contrast, non-protectability is not determined by reference to any
specific goal or value. There is a blank where there should be a term
that expresses a vital goal of our society - the "Progress" project
of a commons of knowledge held in trust.
The Altai court tried to fill in this blank with two Supreme Court
cases, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken68 and Feist Publica-
tions v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc. 9 The quote selected from
Aiken, that "private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
65. The Altai opinion quotes Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp. to the effect that
'[p]laintiffs may not claim copyright protection of an . . . expression that is, if not standard,
then commonplace in the computer software industry.'" Id. at 710 (quoting Brown Bag Software
v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992)). It is not clear from the structure of the
citation within the sentence whether the Second Circuit adopts this definition or is simply endors-
ing it as a possible definition.
Litman argues that "[t]he public domain should be understood not as the realm of material
that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by
leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use." Litman, supra note 10, at
968.
66. The filtration step entailed two other analyses, both of which were tied very tightly to mar-
ket considerations: the court stated that elements dictated by either efficiency or external factors
(such as hardware constraints) are also not protectable. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707-10.
67. Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
68. 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (holding that radio reception of copyrighted songs did not infringe on
the copyright, since reception did not constitute performance of the works).
69. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (holding that the white pages of a telephone directory were not
protected by copyright).
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other arts,"7 provides partial guidance. The quote indicates that
protection under copyright law is not always a given because the
greater good of the public availability of that knowledge is not al-
ways served by a grant of copyright. This "public availability" justi-
fication conveys, however tersely, the missing "Progress" project.
But the Second Circuit's reliance on the language in Feist - that
"[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors," ' - does not give us insight into the blank term. Rather,
the Altai court's use of Feist highlights the absence of a rhetorical
opposition to the "reward[] of artistic creativity. 72
Setting aside for a moment the fact that Feist dealt with factual
compilations, which have had an uneasy relationship to copyright
law for very different reasons than those for computer software,73
what are the other possible objectives of copyright law? The Altai
court never answers this obvious question, which is only partially
answered by the Feist court's ending to its sentence, namely, that
the primary objective of copyright is to ". . . promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." '74 The Supreme Court's own rationale,
however, is unfinished because it omits the larger value or goal that
is served by promoting such "Progress".
The Altai court's reliance on Feist is also revealing because the
nature of the knowledge at issue in the two cases is highly dissimi-
lar. Groping for a policy basis for its decision, the Altai court relied
on the straw argument provided by the facts of Feist.75 The Feist
court had rejected the most extreme form of incentive justification:
that "sweat of the brow" alone justifies protection whether or not
the product of that sweat has any expression unique to the author.78
The knowledge in Feist was simply a collection of facts (entries in a
telephone directory) that had little original expression in and of
themselves. 7  The knowledge in Altai was of an altogether different
sort, as computer program structures express an enormous amount
of original expression.
70. Altai, 982 F.2d at 711 (quoting Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156).
71. Id. (quoting Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290).
72. Id. at 711-12.
73. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 42 (examining application of copyright law to informa-
tion compilations). Feist, of course, is the extreme test of the incentive justification because there
is so little "originality" and so much "labor" involved in creating a telephone directory.
74. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
75. Altai, 982 F.2d at 711.
76. Id.
77. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.
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The Altai opinion, although analytically able, is peculiarly unable
to support emphatically its judgment. The opinion demonstrates the
lack of depth to which we have explored the mandates underlying
our legal treatment of knowledge. The court's decisional urge, which
stems from the problematic application of the low standards of orig-
inality for copyright protection to a high-tech product with utilita-
rian characteristics, could not be framed in terms that give the deci-
sion much persuasive impact. The opinion feels practical rather than
visionary, although it is an important opinion in a controversial area
of copyright law. The court voices its dilemma in the following,
somewhat elliptical manner: "Generally, we think that copyright re-
gistration - with its indiscriminating availability - is not ideally
suited to deal with the highly dynamic technology of computer sci-
ence." 7 The Altai court faced the problem of not having a suffi-
ciently rich "ground" or semiotic context for its decision.79 If the
mandate behind the "Progress" of knowledge were more fully ex-
plored and articulated, then the Altai court could have avoided the
conceptual monopoly or incentive trap.
At least one other recent court of appeals opinion in the area of
computer copyright is equally tongue-tied regarding the larger "Pro-
gress" project. In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,80 the
Ninth Circuit described the "public benefit" that may result from
an otherwise infringing use of a copyrighted work.81 Like Altai, this
decision favored the allegedly infringing defendant."2 In the context
of a fair use analysis,8 3 the court described public benefit as "an
78. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712. The court suggests that were software held to patentability stan-
dards, which are much more rigorous than copyright standards, most software would not be pro-
tected. Id.
Judge Learned Hand had precisely the same rhetorical difficulty when he elegantly expressed
the boundary-making activity at play in copyright decisions, stating that "Nobody has ever been
able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930).
79. The concept of the "ground" in semiotics is that of a context within which we assign mean-
ing to a word. "Functionally, the ground provides a set of assumptions within which we immedi-
ately experience any text." Brion, supra note 6, at 306. As Brion writes, "a court is sometimes
complicit with the ideology that the ground of its language embodies. Sometimes, a court is resis-
tant to this ideology. Sometimes, a court consciously tries to shift it. The ground, however, neces-
sarily plays a strong role in the meaning that the legal process generates." Id. at 315.
80. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 1523.
82. Id. at 1514.
83. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (codifying the "fair use" defense to copy-
right infringement, including the factors to be considered in determining whether a fair use was
made of the work).
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increase in the number of independently designed video game pro-
grams offered for use with the Genesis console" and added that "It
is precisely this growth in creative expression, based on the dissemi-
nation of other creative works and the unprotected ideas contained
in those works, that the Copyright Act was intended to promote." '84
But is this "growth in creative expression" to be valued simply for
its own sake? The court never elaborated on this assertion but sim-
ply repeated it, mantra-like, when later summarizing its findings
with respect to fair use.85 In a later section, the court shifted
ground, returning to the good old incentive justification by sug-
gesting that the "fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act [is] to
encourage the production of original works .... "86
My quibbles with Altai and other opinions are not merely aes-
thetic. By "rhetorical analysis," I do not mean merely to analyze
how persuasive a court's argument is or ought to be. My point is
that all of us who think and write about intellectual property are
coping with an omission: the missing project of "Progress." In the
difficult, boundary-making cases such as Altai, this absence is
keenly felt. But even the Supreme Court in Feist, faced with much
better facts than the Second Circuit had at its disposal in Altai,
could only muster a watered-down endorsement.of the larger project
of "Progress," stating that "copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work. . . . This result is
neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright
advances the progress of science and art."87 The missing project of
"Progress" must be found and articulated. The search commences
in the following section.
84. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 (citing Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., III S. Ct.
1282, 1290 (1991), citing Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985)).
85. Id. at 1527. The statement raises a number of questions in my mind. Is the growth of
creative expression measured by an increased access to technology for would-be creators/competi-
tors who thus decentralize market power in the video game industry? Does it facilitate new and
useful technological innovations through encouraging inter-operable and open architecture sys-
tems? Or does it promote greater access to technology by consumers (through lower prices)? Can
it lead to greater control and real choice by consumers over the fruits of technology or simply to
another row of video game cassettes at Toys-R-Us?
86. Id.
87. Feist, III S. Ct. at 1290.
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II. THE PROJECT OF "PROGRESS"
A. "Progress" and Modernity
The incentive or monopoly balancing test is an incomplete method
of determining whether a patent or copyright promotes "Progress."
The question of whether "Progress" is promoted can only be an-
swered by reference to what we are attempting to do by promoting
the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." In other words, what is
the project of "Progress?" One possibility raised by modernist val-
ues is progress itself, suggesting a recursivity within the clause. In-
deed, as we have seen, courts often conflate this progress (in the
larger sense but with a small "p") with the simple increase in the
sum of human knowledge represented by "Progress" in the copy-
right and patent clause.
From the modernist perspective, "Science and useful Arts" can be
reduced to the single term "knowledge." "Science" in the mid-eight-
eenth century did not have the narrow meaning that we ascribe to it
today. Rather, it referred to " 'a whole body of regular or method-
ological observations or propositions . . . concerning any subject of
speculation' . . . a kind of knowledge or argument, rather than a
kind of subject."88 Only recently has the term come to mean "the
systemized knowledge of nature and the physical world."8 9 Thus,
the Framers of the Constitution meant something broader in scope
than we do now when we refer to the word "science."
In the mid-eighteenth century, "science" was often contrasted to
"Art," with the former connoting theoretical knowledge of any kind,
the latter connoting skill or applied knowledge.90 Thus, its juxtaposi-
tion to "useful Arts" in the patent and copyright clause was not
88. RAYMOND WILLIAMS. KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 233 (1976).
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "science" as "The state or fact of knowing; knowledge or
cognizance of something specified or implied." 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 221 (1933).
89. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, 1275 (2d College ed.
1984); accord 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 88, at 222 ("In modern use, often
treated as synonymous with 'Natural and Physical Science,' and thus restricted to those branches
of study that relate to the phenomena of the material universe and their laws, sometimes with
implied exclusion of pure mathematics.").
90. Five of the first six definitions of "art" in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY refer to some
sort of skill. Definition eight is "[a] practical application of any science; a body or system of rules
serving to facilitate the carrying out of certain principles. In this sense often contrasted with
science." I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra 'note 88, at 468. Science is
"[clonstradistinguished from art . . . [by the former's] concern[] with theoretic truth, and an art
with methods for effecting certain results." Id. at 221.
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unusual. 91 The "useful Arts," what we would now call applied sci-
ence or technology, were often distinguished from "fine arts," then
as now denoting art that is more aesthetic than practical, such as
poetry, painting, sculpture, and the like. 92 We can therefore refer to
"Progress of Science and useful Arts" in shorthand as the "Pro-
gress" of knowledge, as that is what the term has consistently meant
over the past two hundred years.
"Progress" of knowledge is an essential tenet of modernism,
which in all its guises is characterized by optimism in the effects of
91. Some have suggested that the word "Science" was originally associated with the work of
"Authors," whereas the term "useful Arts" referred to the work of "Inventors." See e.g., PAUL
GOLDSTEIN. COPYRIGHT, PATENT. TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 20-21 (Rev. 3d
ed., 1993) (stating "Colonial usage and syntax indicate that the Constitution's framers, in speak-
ing of "Science" in clause 8, were referring to the work of authors, and by "useful Arts" meant
the work of inventors."). If this was the original understanding, at the latest it had collapsed by
the time the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (stating that
"[tihe very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the





An equally plausible construction is:
Science and the useful Arts
Authors Inventors
Writings Discoveries
The second interpretation is bolstered by the modifier "respective," for "Writings and Discover-
ies," but not for "Authors and Inventors."
92. See WILLIAMS, supra note 88, at 34. While other terms in the clause have received careful
attention (see the Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)), "Science and useful Arts" is char-
acterized by ambiguity. One could argue, based on the simultaneous inclusion of "useful Arts"
and omission of "fine Arts" from the clause, that the latter were not intended to be covered.
However, the distinction between "useful Arts" and fine arts has become irrelevant or blurred for
copyright purposes, and the latter has apparently been incorporated into the former. See Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) (dismissing the "suggestion that paint-
ing and engraving unless for a mechanical end are not among the useful arts, the progress of
which Congress is empowered by the Constitution to promote. The Constitution does not limit the
useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs."). The distinction has retained its relevance
in patent law via the statutory requirement of utility. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("Inventions pat-
entable: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor .... ") (emphasis added). More recently,
the Supreme Court has tended to associate copyright more with the fine arts than with science.
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (holding that a grant of
copyright must promote "literature, music, and the other arts."). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
recent opinion in Feist refers to arts and science in the current vernacular, while carefully defining
"Author" and "Writings" as terms of art. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Sev. Co. Inc., Ill S.
Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991).
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progress from and through the liberating power of knowledge.9 3 The
modernist faith in the emancipatory potential of knowledge points to
some other larger goal of the copyright and patent clause aside from
the mere accumulation of knowledge. That "Progress" is intended in
turn to promote progress is obvious once one considers the Enlight-
enment-influenced beliefs prevalent at the time the patent and copy-
right clause came into being.
The "Progress" mandate is tied directly to the various Enlighten-
ment projects. In his study of the influence of Enlightenment
thought on American intellectual history, Henry F. May claims that
Enlightenment thought existed with religion and as religion. 4 He
defines Enlightment as religion bipartitely: "First, that the present
age is more enlightened than the past; and second, that we under-
stand nature and [hu]man[s] best through the use of our natural
faculties. . . . All are excluded, that is, who think that the surest
guide for human beings is revelation, tradition, or illumination.' ' 95
The faith in reason characteristic of American Enlightenment
thought relies heavily on the widespread and free availability of
knowledge.
May's spare definition of Enlightenment as faith, which is shaped
by the problem of having to include many diverse and contradictory
Enlightenment thinkers, does not quite capture what is so inevitably
good about progress. At least three different strains in American
intellectual thought combined to link the idea of progress with the
idea of improvement. These can be classified roughly into the mille-
narian, pragmatic, and growth ideologies.
The millenarian strain derived from the marriage of reason to
93. An extreme but not atypical example of such optimism is the millenialists' "notion of his-
tory as a process generally moving upward by a series of majestic stages, culminating inevitably in
some great, transforming event, which is to solve the dilemmas of society .... " E.L. TUVESON.
MILLENNIUM AND UTOPIA (1949), quoted in ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
127 (1980).
94. HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
95. Id. at xiv (1976). The first part of May's definition is consistent with our current notion of
progress in the temporal or spatial sense: A "moving forward or onward," as well as in the cul-
tural sense of "advanc[ing] toward perfection or to a higher or better state; improve." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 89, at 1135. That is, Enlightenment as faith approximates
the meaning of progress and, in fact, the original meaning of progress was amplified by the En-
lightenment. Raymond Williams notes that the sense of forward movement in the word progress
began to develop at the end of the seventeenth century, a meaning that was given momentum by
the idea of a linear (rather than circular) movement of history in the eighteenth century. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 88, at 205-06. Prior to that, it simply meant a march, but not necessarily a
forward-moving one. Id. at 205.
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religion to produce an idea of progress "in the arts and sciences
[that] is held to be at once a sign of the imminence of the golden
age of the spirit on earth and a cause of this imminence." 9 This
utopian faith in progress produced an optimism that knowledge will
surely yield good results rather than bad, and improvements rather
than regressions. The idea of improvement in this utopian or Chris-
tian millenarian strain of progress was enhanced by the pragmatic
ideology of progress. This ideology focused on the deliberate, ra-
tional acts of persons that increasingly brought the natural and so-
cial world under control.9 These utopian and pragmatic elements in
the idea of progress were captured by the assumption of limitless
economic growth in conjunction with what Christopher Lasch
termed "Adam Smith's [riehabilitation of [d]esire."98 He wrote:
It was not the secularization of the Kingdom of God or even the new stress
on processes intrinsic to historical development that chiefly distinguished
progressive ideology from earlier views of history. Its original appeal and its
continuing plausibility derived from the more specific assumption that insa-
tiable appetites, formerly condemned as a source of social instability and
personal unhappiness, could drive the economic machine - just as man's
insatiable curiosity drove the scientific project - and thus ensure a never-
ending expansion of productive forces.99
96. NISBET. supra note 93, at 127. Nisbet quotes Sacvan Bercovitch's "The American
Jeremiad":
American millennialism pervaded the entire spectrum of social thought. Educators
planned for a "spiritual revolution" that would bring humanity to perfection. Political
and moral reformers advertised their programs as the "revolutionary consummation
of God's plan." Prominent thinkers urged that technology would "revolutionize the
land" into being a "human-divine paradise," where "mechanical power [would] be
matched by a new access of vitality . . . imaginative, utopian, transcendent; and the
acquisitive spirit would 'typify' the 'infinite' reaches of the soul.
Id. at 197-98.
97. DONALD H. MEYER, THE DEMOCRATIC ENLIGHTENMENT 153 (1976) ("It suggests purpose
that is not implicit in the historical process nor imposed on it from above by a benevolent deity,
but is worked out through history by men acting deliberately, coming to decisions and devising the
means of implementing them.").
98. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 52
(1991) [hereinafter LASCH, TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN].
99. Id. Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, and influenced a number
of constitutional founders, including James Madison, although "almost everyone who responded to
it blended the parts they approved of with ideas or biases they had previously entertained, and
thus ended up with something different from the original." FORREST McDONALD. Novus ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 128 (1985). Both Smith and
David Hume believed in stages of progress through which all societies evolved. Id. at 132. In the
commercial stage, "The spirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once
roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry
improvements into every art and science." Id. at 133 (quoting Hume).
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In Lasch's view, material growth, rather than material or moral im-
provement, was inevitable once progress was linked to unrestrained
desire.' This growth ideology nonetheless relies on the idea of for-
ward movement through knowledge manipulable by humankind.
"Progress" is inextricable from the "Progress" of knowledge.
This "Progress" of knowledge catalyzes as well as mirrors the his-
torical progress of increasingly enlightened thought and action. Cen-
tral to the modernist tradition is a type of "Progress" defined by the
"privileging of ego-centered reason.. . . in which the rationalist self
knows few (if any) limits on its ability to understand and rationalize
the world."1 Faith in reason replaces faith. Few phenomena are
considered incapable of being apprehended fully by well-reasoned
thought. Enlightenment as faith does not recognize limits to its
transformative potential. The Enlightenment-influenced American
intellect viewed (and continues to view) progress as the path to a
permanently improved condition of life for humankind. Whether or
not modernist progress is primarily associated with utopian, prag-
matic, or growth perspectives, without it one cannot meaningfully
interpret the constitutional mandate for "Progress of Science and
useful Arts." The encouragement of knowledge is a key element of
the " 'master narratives' of the Enlightenment - progress toward
material well-being, truth, and justice (. . . [or] bread, knowledge,
and freedom)."' 1 2 It is also a key precondition for these narratives.
Regarding justice, Americans of course were intensely involved in
the creation of a practical political experiment that had as its pur-
pose the furtherance of human "[l]ife, [1]iberty, and the [p]ursuit of
[h]appiness.' 0 3 "Useful Arts" and "Science" presumably aided in
achieving these political ends, as an enlightened citizenry could bet-
ter engage in building a strong republic and in participatory democ-
100. LASCH, TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 98, at 52 ; cf Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law
and Economics Moral? - Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal Critique of Posner's
Economic Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L REV. 147 (1990) (arguing that Adam Smith intended values
other than growth to be part of neoclassical economic theory).
101. Schlag, supra note 14, at 1210-11.
102. Regenia Gagnier, Feminist Postmodernism: The End of Feminism or the Ends of The-
ory?, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 21, 23 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
1990).
103. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). "America was itself an experi-
ment in an 'age of experiments.' " MEYER, supra note 97, at vii. Thomas Jefferson liked to use the
term "experiment" to describe the American political process and the Constitution. DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 212 (1948).
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racy. 104 A government's power to regulate information through the
grant copyrights is historically associated with its policies governing
the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression,1"5 as well as
its policies on universal education.10 6
But Enlightenment as faith spawned numerous projects for
human self-actualization in addition to political ones. One end was
the improvement of socioeconomic conditions, which at that time
were often unforgiving, even for the well off. The first American
association of scientists, the American Philosophical Society, was
concerned with "all . .. experiments that let light into the nature of
things, tend to increase the power of man over matter, and multiply
the conveniences or pleasures of life. '10 7
Americans were also keenly aware of the disadvantages in their
socioeconomic and cultural status vis-A-vis European nations. Don-
104. The idea that the exchange of ideas was necessary for the happiness of a democratically
governed people is evident, for example, in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which states:
"Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, [is]
necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties .... " MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 5,
sec. 2, reprinted in 3 Kurland & Lerner, supra note 13, at 39; see also BUGHEE, supra note 7, at
114, 116, 117 (discussing the preambles to the first copyright acts of Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, and Rhode Island, respectively).
Christopher Lasch wrote in 1992 that:
Political equality - citizenship - equalizes people who are otherwise unequal in
their capacities, and the universalization of citizenship therefore has to be accompa-
nied not only by formal training in the civic arts but by measures designed to assure
the broadest distribution of economic and political responsibility . . . . It is in this
sense that universal citizenship implies a whole world of heroes."
Christopher Lasch, A Reply to Jeffrey Isaac, 93 SALMAGUNDI 98, 107 (1992).
105. As Benjamin Kaplan observed after recounting the origins of copyright in England, "copy-
right has the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of the censorship." BENJAMIN
KAPLAN. AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 4 (1967); see also L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech,
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) (arguing that copyright power and the First
Amendment are inseparable).
In England, copyright protection originated as an authoritarian impulse to exert control over
printed works. For example, in 1557 Queen Mary chartered the Stationers' Company, an associa-
tion of printers and publishers who had the exclusive right to print books licensed by the state, to
suppress Protestant literature in an attempt to reverse the English Reformation. BUGBEE, supra
note 7, at 50. Copyright protection in-the states prior to the adoption of the Constitution was not
tied to government censorship, although there had been some government control of publishing
through monopolies and censorship in some colonies such as Massachusetts. Barbara Ringer, Two
Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERI-
CAN PATENT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 120-21 (1977).
106. It had a profound effect, for example, on Jefferson's views on education. See BOORSTIN,
supra note 103, at 217-25; MCDONALD. supra note 99, at 191 n.10.
107. Benjamin Franklin, A Proposal for Promoting Useful Knowledge Among the British
Plantations in America (letter dated May 14, 1743), in 6 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
14, 16 (Jared Sparks ed., 1838). This letter contained the first proposal for the American Philo-
sophical Society.
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aid Meyer describes how "[t]hroughout most of the eighteenth cen-
tury the American provincials were dependent on England particu-
larly for their books and for most of the other implements of
culture, including everything from precision tools and scientific ap-
paratus to literary style and ideas."' 8 In the diaries written in Eu-
rope while the Constitution was in the process of being framed, Jef-
ferson listed "Objects Worthy of Attention for Americans,"
including "Agriculture," with respect to which he stated: "Every-
thing belonging to this art and whatever is related to it. Useful or
agreeable animals that might be transported to America. New spe-
cies of plants for the farm or garden, according to the climates of
the different states."' 0 At the time, the United States was a net
importer of ideas and technology; in other words, a lesser developed
country. 110 Thus, another end to which the stimulus of "useful Arts"
and "Science" could be harnessed was an improved global socioeco-
nomic status."'
Lasch writes that "the idea of democracy came to be associated
more and more closely with the prospect of universal abundance."11"2
The Enlightenment conflation of political well-being ("justice") with
economic well-being ("bread") always existed, although perhaps at
first there was less emphasis on sheer growth and more on the im-
provement of adverse conditions. But whatever the political or eco-
nomic ends to which "useful Arts" and "Science" were practically
directed, they seemed to occupy a unique position within Enlighten-
ment as faith. Observation of phenomena through one's natural fac-
ulties played a fundamental role within this faith. Even the most
deeply skeptical of continental Enlightenment thinkers, those who
108. MEYER, supra note 97, at xx.
109. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON'S EUROPEAN TRAVEL DIARIES 36 (James M.
Morris & Persephone Weene eds., 1987) [hereinafter JEFFERSON'S TRAVEL DIARIES]. With re-
spect to "Courts," by contrast, Jefferson stated that "[a] slight acquaintance with these regal
assemblies will suffice to show you that under the most imposing exterior they are the weakest and
worst part of mankind." Id. at 37. "Mechanical Arts," "Lighter Mechanical Arts," "Gardens,"
and "Politics" merit attention, however. Id. at 36-37. Jefferson's earlier NOTES ON VIRGINIA re-
veal the same concentration of detail on practical uses of science. Dean M. Sagar, Introduction to
JEFFERSON'S TRAVEL DIARIES, supra at 9, 11-12.
110. MEYER. supra note 97, at xxi ("in ideas, the Americans were ...importers rather than
exporters throughout most of the eighteenth century.").
I 11. In light of the United States's then-status as a "lesser developed country," it is interesting
to note Barbara Ringer's claim that the absence of protection for foreign works in the original
Copyright Act of 1790 impeded the growth of a domestic writing industry by neglecting the im-
pact of inexpensive editions of English books. Ringer, supra note 105, at 127-28.
112. LASCH. TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN. supra note 98, at 68.
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questioned the idea of reason, thought positively of science, particu-
larly what we now call applied science.'1 3 Yet it is important to note
"the Americans drew not only on science but on what Jefferson
called 'the harmonizing sentiments of the day' for moral guid-
ance.""' Knowledge was important, even essential, to the democ-
racy project; scientific validity was not, however, the sine qua non of
its utility. Knowledge eolved symbiotically with the uses to which it
was put. This point is one link between the modernist and
postmodernist traditions, discussed in the next section.
The "Progress" project of the patent and copyright clause is
twined with the progress mandate of the Enlightenment. Recall the
second part of May's definition of Enlightenment as religion:
"[T]hat we understand nature and man best through the use of our
natural faculties."" 5 This principle accordingly nourished a role of
knowledge that is essential, indeed inseparable, from whatever pro-
gress project was at hand. As one writer noted:
[I]t is the object of scientific research to understand the human benefits for
which creation was intended . . . . [Ajny discovery of the workings of na-
ture, even any particular fact, from a new plant to mastodon bones . . . was
bound to prove useful to [hu]man[s] - that was how all nature had been
framed."1 6
While the enthusiastically teleological view of science and nature
shared by the members of the American Philosophical Society prior
to the American Revolution"17 is not the dominant view today, the
113. Meyer writes that many Enlightenment thinkers "frequently insisted on the limitations of
man's rational powers." MEYER, supra note 97, at xii. However,
Science was the one common piety of the French Skeptics. Though they praised
Newton as the greatest genius in history, they abandoned in practice the easy
profundities of the early Newtonian popularizers. Physical theory was seldom one of
their major interests; the preference for pure as against applied science is a nine-
teenth- or a seventeenth-century phenomenon. The Encyclopedists found the greatest
excitement in the useful arts, engineering, agriculture, and technology. These pursuits
were often contrasted with useless speculation in metaphysics and theology.
MAY. supra note 94, at 109.
114. MEYER, supra note 97, at 104.
115. MAY, supra note 94, at xiv (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
117. As May explains,
Despite their large range . ..the active members of the [American] Philosophical
Society shared a common view of nature and science. . . . [They] saw nature as
designed by a wise creator for the use and edification of man.
The most famous example of the[ir] teleological view of nature comes from Jeffer-
son, who insisted in discussing mastodon bones that the mastodon must exist some-
where, because for a form of life to disappear would-serve no purpose in the economy
1993]
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basic Enlightenment take on knowledge leaves more than a mere
residue on our current endeavors. The essential characteristics of the
Enlightenment as faith continue to dominate legal as well as other
forms of discourse. Enlightenment perspectives which are still very
much with us today include the privileging of individual-centered
reasoning as a primary means of apprehending the world, the em-
phasis on empiricism or positivism as required characteristics of any
intellectual project of integrity, and the continual insistence (even
on the part of those deeply suspicious of both individual-centered
reasoning and of empiricist and positivist approaches) that critical
thinking (a more "progressive" way of thinking) will point the way
to transformative action. 11 8 But these perspectives are increasingly
challenged and critiqued by postmodernist theory, and it is to these
challenges and critiques that I now turn.
B. "Progress" and Postmodernity
If "a distinctive feature of [the historical age of] modernity is its
faith in the link between human power and human freedom,"11 9 a
distinctive feature of postmodern critiques of the assumptions of mo-
dernity can be performed in a question which I would like you, dear
reader, to answer immediately: What kind of music shall I buy?
120
This question evidences one characteristic of postmodernism: acts,
including written texts, are necessarily embedded in a culture of
consumption created by communication technology such as sound
recordings.12 ' This communication technology (protected largely by
of nature.
Id. at 215-16.
118. David Luban, Legal Modernism. 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1656, (1986) ("What are the roots of
Critical Legal Studies? 'The immediate intellectual background . . . is the . . . achievement of
early twentieth century modernism.' ") (quoting Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 587 (1983)).
119. Jeffrey Isaac, On Christopher Lasch, 93 SALMAGUNDI 82, 85 (1992).
120. "As Russell Baker (1991) writes: 'Nowadays Whitman would not hear America singing.
. . . He would write, "I see America listening to nearly perfect Japanese technological reproduc-
tion of singing.'" Steven L. Winter, For What It's Worth. 26 LAW & Soc'v REV. 789, 794
(1992).
I also insert here the semi-obligatory postmodern footnote that footnotes do not necessarily
provide supporting authority for propositions stated in this section of the article. See Rosemary J.
Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Demo-
cratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L REV. 1853, 1856 n.22 (1991) [hereinafter Coombe, Objects of Prop-
erty]; Schlag, supra note 14, at 1248 n.200.
121. See Coombe, Objects of Property, supra note 120, at 1862. She writes:
Postmodernity is distinguished by a dramatic restructuring of capitalism in the post-
war period, a reconstruction of labor and capital markets, the displacement of produc-
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intellectual property law) transforms modern society into the
postmodern information society, a society in which knowledge con-
tinually reflects back into social practices, which in turn create
knowledge.122 And asking you, the anonymous reader, to spontane-
ously answer the needs of my self (whom you do not know), high-
lights the postmodern view that I am not an autonomous, self-di-
recting agent that reaches normative decisions through reasoned
thought.2 3 The postmodern self that I am is a contingent self, de-
fined through contingent structures within language and culture,124
within the context of "accelerating bureaucratization, commodifica-
tion and commercialization of legal [and other] . . . system[s].' 25
Yet another: the grand narratives of law - liberty, justice, property
(yes, even civil procedure) - exist only through the local practices
of these decentered selves. Global intersects with local to produce
"glocality."'' 26 Just one more: the text itself - as well as my writing
tion relations to non-metropolitan regions, the consolidation of mass communications
in corporate conglomerates, and the pervasive penetration of electronic media and
information technologies. Such processes have coalesced in the Western . . . societies
oriented toward consumption.
Id. See also Winter, supra note 120, at 796. The individual reacts to:
The escalating processes of commodification and consumerization characteristic of
postmodernity. It is common to think of the conspicuous consumption that typifies
consumer culture as a matter of individual consumers acting out their materialistic
values. But the postmodernist notion of performativity suggests that the meaning of
consumer goods should be read in the social practices in which they participate.
Id.
122. See GIDDENS. supra note 3, at 38. He writes that:
With the advent of modernity, reflexivity takes on a different character. It is intro-
duced into the very basis of system reproduction, such that thought and action are
constantly refracted back upon one another ...
The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are
constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those
very practices, thus constitutively altering their character.
Id.
123. See generally ROSENAU, supra note 25, at 42-61 (chapter entitled "Subverting the
Subject").
124. The postmodern demise of the subject is related to the structuralist emphasis "on the
formal laws of a system's functioning, on the linguistic construction of these structures, on the
symbolic meaning they carry, and/or on change as manifest in structural transformations," as
opposed to "a subject with any personal capacity to maintain or change social relations." Id. at
46.
125. Winter, supra note 120, at 802.
126. Saskia Sassen, Regulatory Fractures in the Global City, paper presented at the Law &
Society 1993 Annual Meeting (May 28, 1993). Giddens feels that:
The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering rela-
tions between "absent" others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-
face interaction. In conditions of modernity, place becomes increasingly phantasma-
goric: that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of
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it, your reading it, our thinking about it - is an act even when it is
not self-consciously an act (as in a command or a question); and our
intellectual and other responses to it are acts. Knowledge is per-
formed.127 Finally (fooled you!), the question illustrates the style
and substance of postmodernism as "following . . . the ironic twists
and turns of difference, discontinuity, and disjuncture." 2 ' What
does music have to do, have to do with it, to paraphrase Tina
Turner? 29
Critiques of progress that derive from the modernist tradition
share a focus on the negative effects of progress: that the largest
hurdle facing efforts to build a more satisfying society may be "a
distinctively modern faith in technology . . o From postmodern
perspectives (to the extent they can be lumped together), the prob-
lem with progress, like the trouble with tribbles, is even more mani-
fold. Beyond the recognition that material progress does not neces-
sarily lead to an improved way of life, only to a different one,
postmodernism rejects progress as one of the delusionary grand nar-
ratives of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment views of progress
inscribe in it a universality as well as a forward linearity that is
inconsistent with progress being "made" by acts of contingently lo-
cated individuals.13 ' Rather than relying on concepts such as a pro-
gress that derives in a direct linear fashion from knowledge produc-
social influences quite distant from them.
'GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 18-19; see also DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY
3-9 (1989) (discussing Jonathan Raban's perception of the urban city in Raban's book SOFT
CITY).
127. See generally MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Steven F.
Rendall trans., 1984) (arguing that readers of text are as active as writers of text in the produc-
tion of meaning).
128. Schlag, supra note 14, at 1241.
129. Music in fact has much to do with postmodernism. One subtle irony posed by this question
is that the common piety of postmodernists is the idea (which is also the act) of performance.
Postmodern performance puts each of us on a stage even if we can't hold a note. In various ways,
this question subverts the generally held idea of performance of the music as the performance
itself (Tina Turner being the example par excellence of the performer qua performer): My choice
of music is, to postmodernists, a type of performance (the consumer qua performer); the question
about choice of music is also a performance, albeit textual (the text qua performer); and Russell
Baker's rewriting of Walt Whitman's poem (see supra note 120) is a postmodern performance
that transforms the first type of performer to the last.
130. Isaac, supra note 119, at 83.
131. Kitty Calavita and Carroll Seron, Postmodernism and Protest: Recovering the Sociologi-
cal Imagination, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 765, 766 (1992) ("While postmodernism defies easy
classification and is almost by definition resistant to definitional boundaries, at base the
postmodernist approach seems to entail a critique of social research, questioning Enlightenment
values including notions of causality, commonality, and progress.").
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tion (mastodon bones = facts - utility to humans = better social/
political/economic organizations = heaven on earth),
postmodernists "affirm instead the infinite play of desire, non-iden-
tity, difference, repetition and displacement earlier thinkers had de-
cried as an expression of alienation and estrangement."' 132
Postmodern "Progress," unlike modern "Progress," lacks the latter's
knee-jerk faith in the emancipatory potential of progress per se, but
not just because the negative effects of progress have been revealed.
It does so because that Enlightenment view of progress is insuffi-
ciently attentive to the everyday acts, which may or may not be
emancipatory, of the decentered individual. 133
Yet, importantly, a postmodern "Progress" is not defined simply
by the eschewal of the grand story line of modern progress.
"Postmodern" progress is progress that is consistent with the "bot-
tom-up" approach of postmodernism, 34 one that recognizes that
"progress"ive acts may be backward as well as forward, perhaps
sideways, and most often circular (as exemplified by the accelerated
reflexivity of knowledge 35). Thus it more readily accommodates
limits to growth, such as the calls for sustainable development. It is
one that operates "self-consciously" within a global context of infor-
mation technology, and thus pays heed to differences in access to
information and to the consequences of knowledge distribution. It is
also one that encourages the iterative (though erratic) relation of
knowledge to human social practices - the perpetual feedback of
information to human beings who in turn act on that information,
changing it in the process. Postmodern "Progress," therefore, neces-
132. Schlag, supra note 14, at 1218 (quoting MARTIN JAY. MARXISM AND TOTALITY 511-512
(1984)).
133. "[Clonsciousness is understood to be not a form of revealed wisdom but something that is
constructed through social interaction; it is not an attitude or an idea but 'a way of operating,'
enacted in social practices." Patricia Ewick, Postmodern Melancholia, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
755, 760 (1992).
134. ROSENAu, supra note 25, at 22 (Some postmodernists "substitute [for theory] a substan-
tive focus on the local, on daily life, and on traditional narrative for the hegemonic theory of
mainstream social science."). As one author noted:
This emphasis on specific historical locations does not deny that large-scale move-
ments are possible, moreover. It instead envisions such movements in terms of poten-
tial alliances constructed through interaction among differently situated citizens
rather than through the acceptance of an overriding meta-narrative and singular
identity.
Michael W. McCann, Resistance, Reconstruction, and Romance in Legal Scholarship, 26 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 733, 747 (1992).




sarily changes the relatively undifferentiated incentive or monopoly
doctrinal framework that characterizes current intellectual property
case law.
Challenges to the promise of material well-being abound in the
late twentieth century. Each example of a technological fix such as
the polio vaccine can be countered by an example of a technologi-
cally generated problem such as acid rain. Optimism in a progress
without externalities has been questioned and found wanting. Per-
haps the main hubris of Enlightenment as faith is its premise of the
idea of limitless growth, a premise whose falseness is now attracting
widespread attention.1"6 Fused with the consumer-driven economy,
the modern idea of "Progress" no longer recognizes the temporal,
spatial, and moral limits that characterized previous ideologies, both
religious and political. The promise of universal abundance distrib-
uted in some fashion to all of humankind provided a social justifica-
tion for an enterprise that would be otherwise based solely on indi-
vidual desire.1 37
That quest for universal abundance is now deeply suspect. 138 A
spectacular increase in growth has not resulted in a minimally ac-
ceptable standard of living for even a quarter of the world's popula-
tion. la' Progress's
best line of defense, .... [one that] links progress to an indefinite expansion
of the demand for consumer goods[,] . . . presupposes conditions that no
longer obtain. It presupposes a constant revision of material expectations, a
never-ending redefinition of luxuries as necessities, continual incorporation
of new groups into the culture of consumption, and ultimately the creation
136. Lasch claims that the most significant Enlightenment impact on the idea of progress came
from Adam Smith's rehabilitation of "ordinary ambition, vanity, [and] greed" as the driving
forces of an economy. LASCH, TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 98, at 55.
137. According to Lasch:
The promise of universal abundance has always contained egalitarian implications
without which it would have carried very little moral authority. Those implications
were open to conflicting interpretations. Some people argued that it was enough to
increase the general pool of goods and services, in the expectation that everyone's
standard of living would rise as a result. Others demanded more radical measures
designed not merely to increase the total wealth but to distribute it more equitably.
But no one who believed in progress conceived of a limit on productive capacity as a
whole. No one envisioned a return to a more frugal existence; such views fell outside
the progressive consensus.
Id.
138. The movement termed "sustainable development" has an ecology-based critique of pro-
gress. See INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES.
WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT (1980) [hereinafter WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY].
139. See generally, OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 21.
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of a global market that embraces populations formerly excluded from any
reasonable expectation of affluence.'"
Recent estimates of the increase in industrial output that would be
required to place developing countries on a consumption par with
industrialized countries by the time the world population stabilizes
at some point in the next century indicate that such output would
have to be five to ten times what it is today.141 It is unlikely, how-
ever, that these prerequisites to universal abundance are environ-
mentally sustainable. The technologies upon which the developed
world currently relies prey upon resources that in some cases are
reaching their limits. Aside from the depletion of natural resources,
industrialization creates major externalities. In the two-year period
during which the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment undertook to study the concept of sustainable development,
four major industrial accidents occurred, including the incidents at
Bhopal and Chernobyl. 42 A biologist has predicted that one-fifth or
more of the world's species of plants and animals could disappear
within the next 30 years of increasing development.14 The tissue of
the ecosystem, of which humans are only one (albeit very powerful)
part, and on which they depend, is fraying at a drastic rate.
Postmodern "Progress" incorporates ecologically-based limits to ec-
onomic growth, as well as the need for the redistribution of existing
material wealth within present and between present and future gen-
erations.' That is, progress moves backwards and sideways, as well
140. LASCH, TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 98, at 168-69.
141. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 21, at 213.
142. Id. at 228-29.
143. WILSON. supra note 19, at 346.
144. As the WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY states:
Human beings, in their quest for economic development and enjoyment of the riches
of nature, must come to terms with the reality of resource limitation and the carrying
capacities of ecosystems, and must take account of the needs of future generations.
• . . For if the object of development is to provide for social and economic welfare,
the object of conservation is to ensure earth's capacity to sustain development and to
support all life.
WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 138, at I. The World Commission on Environment
and Development also notes that:
Meeting essential needs requires not only a new era of economic growth for nations in
which the majority are poor, but an assurance that those poor get their fair share of
the resources requiied to sustain that growth. . . . [Slustainable development is not a
fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development,
and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs.
OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 21, at 8-9.
19931
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as forward.
While economic growth has provided the majority of Americans
with an extremely elevated standard of living (evidenced by the vast
quantities of music from which to choose), it has also changed the
very nature of our participatory democracy. 145 The information sat-
uration affects our social, cultural, and ultimately political practices
profoundly. (Although this claim might seem to move from univer-
sal to particular in violation of one of the tenets of postmodernism,
postmodernists are neither ahistorical nor completely severed from
structural notions of economy, society, and polity.)' 46 Even within a
modernist discourse that has experienced the negative consequences
of technology, technologically optimistic readings of this change out-
shout the more cautionary accounts. 47 This pervasive infusion of
media in American lives is like a carnival of images, a cause for and
instantiation of Dionysian celebration by some self-described com-
munication junkies. 8 The technologies for collecting, organizing,
145. "Instead of the spectacular displays of power embodied in the sovereign, dramatized by
the scaffold and played before an assembled audience, power is now invisibly and anonymously
inserted into daily life." Ewick, supra note 133, at 758. "The point is ... this materialist concep-
tion of postmodernity asserts that those who would challenge power are now up against something
altogether different." Id. at 756.
146. Allan C. Hutchinson, Doing the Right Thing? Toward a Postmodern Politics, 26 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 773, 779 (1992). Hutchinson writes:
Postmodernism does not denigrate or dismiss the value and truth of historical experi-
ence or human suffering - that would be nonsensical and unpardonable. Instead, it
avoids essentializing its value or truth by insisting on a multiplicity of values and
truths ....
In rejecting History, it does not ignore the lessons of history, and in rejecting Telos,
it does not eschew the value of criticism. As all claims are located within a dynamic
set of social practices, postmodernism insists that all theorizing pay attention 'to the
structural circumstances of that social milieu and, in particular, to theorizing its own
embeddedness in such historical contexts.
Id.
147. See generally Rob Kling, Computerization and Social Transformations, 16 SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 342 (1991).
148. WIRED, which made its debut in the spring of 1993, is a computer magazine - early
Rolling Stone meets PC Week - that celebrates this ethic of computer culture. A telling inter-
view with Camille Paglia in its premiere issue, a portion of which is reproduced with the inter-
viewee's handwritten corrections and comments (no Jeffrey Masson problem here), states:
[1 was very ilnfluenced by McLuhan. . . . We all thought, "This is one of the great
prophets of our time." What's happened to him? Why are these people reading Lacan
or Foucault who have no awareness at all of mass media? Why would anyone go on
about the school of Saussure? In none of that French crap is there any reference to
media. Our culture is a pop culture. Americans are the ones who have to be interpret-
ing the pop culture reality.
Stewart Brand, Scream of Consciousness, WIRED, Premiere Issue 1993, at 53 (copy with hand-
written corrections on file with the author).,
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and distributing information create an unparalleled access into (or
at least observation of) the formal political process' 49 and create
new opportunities for grass-roots political participation.
Yet, as with unadulterated material growth, an Orwellian dark
side exists to this increased access to information: a decrease in
grass-roots control over the use and consequences of information.
This loss of control has many sources. In the highly industrialized
countries like the United States, a relatively small number of giant
private entities control imagery through intellectual property
laws. 50 Criticism, mockery, or the construction of countervailing
images have become increasingly difficult endeavors, even if per-
formed by other corporate entities, much less individuals. 151 Yet
American media culture is not passively consumed. Fans of televi-
sion shows, movies, comic books, and rock bands themselves partici-
pate in the creation of that culture. Henry Jenkins has observed that
pop culture "fans passionately embrace favored texts and attempt to
integrate media representations within their own social experience.
.. . [Such participation] challenges the very notion of literature as
149. In just one half-week in July 1993, 1 noticed three cross-media instances of this phenome-
non in just one newspaper. The New York Times reported Norman Mailer's observation that
watching Oliver North's testimony on television was as addicting as watching cartoons. Scott
Spencer, Lawrence Walsh's Last Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, § 6, at 11. On the same day, it
reviewed a new videotape that cut and pasted together similarly addictive testimony of Professor
Anita Hill and Justice Clarence Thomas. Caryn James, Television View; Hill and Thomas Tes-
tify Again for $24.95, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, § 2, at 26. The op-ed page a few days later
carried several letters refuting Robert Bork's assertion that Supreme Court nomination hearings
should not be televised. High Court Nominations Were Always Political, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1993, at A18.
150. See Duncan M. Davidson, Reverse Engineering Software Under Copyright Law: The IBM
PC BIOS, in Weil & Snapper, supra note 7, at 147, 154-56 (discussing successful attempts by
IBM and Apple in preventing competitors from cloning software); Jon Wiener, Murdered Ink,
THE NATION, May 31, 1993, at 743 (describing the Walt Disney Company's successful efforts to
"kill" critical books). See generally BAGOIKIAN, supra note 24, at 3-26 (pointing out that twenty-
three corporations control most of the U.S. media); CONTU REPORT. supra note 52, at 36 (Her-
sey, Commir., dissenting) ("The country has lately seen an alarming trend toward the concentra-
tion of economic power in all the communications industries.").
151. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a copyright infringement case involving
the music group 2 Live Crew's song "Ugly Woman," which is a parody of Roy Orbison's song
"Pretty Woman." Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993). This case implicates racially-based rather than corpora-
tion-based cultural control, as well as sexism that transcends racial categories. The replacement of
Orbison's sentimental lyrics and sappy melody with rap lyrics that an eight-year-old misogynist
would find uproarious is not any type of progress. However, I do think that the claimed parody is
a true parody - of unself-consciously "white bread" culture. One wonders how readily Roy
Orbison's estate would have granted permission to a muzak-maker to pipe a muzak version into
Wal-Marts across the land.
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a kind of private property to be controlled by textual producers and
their academic interpreters." '152 Rosemary Coombe argues that the
postmodern individual's response to media images is itself a creative
and ultimately political act that militates against the overprotection
of shared cultural imagery by trademark and right of publicity
laws.' 5
3
Moreover, through recent technological developments, the United
States information and communication industries are on the cusp of
a corporate concentration of previously unimaginable proportions. A
"data highway" of communications networks will impact virtually
every home and office. Government agencies, 154 cable television
companies, newspaper publishing empires, telephone companies, en-
tertainment and information conglomerates, and computer compa-
nies are motivated into partial cooperation by the beckoning billion-
dollar markets of high-definition television, interactive shopping, and
video-on-demand. 55 This commercial, "private" focus has already
impacted the debate on the terms and conditions of access to this
data highway; cultural and political expression is taking a back seat
to economic concerns.' 56 Intellectual property law has not developed
a vocabulary adequate to express the need for brakes or checks on
the control of information by the private sector. If one or two corpo-
152. Henry Jenkins IIl, Star Trek Rerun, Reread, Rewritten: Fan Writing as Textual Poach-
ing, in CLOSE ENCOUNTERS: FILM, FEMINISM AND SCIENCE FICTION 171, 172-73 (Constance Pen-
Icy et al. eds., 1991).
153. Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics,
and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 366 (1992); Coombe, Objects of
Property, supra note 120, at 1864.
154. The National Research and Education Network ("NREN"), a.k.a. the "data highway,"
was authorized by the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-194, § 102,
105 Stat. 1594, 1598-99 (1991), and is scheduled to be in place by the mid-1990's. Various gov-
ernment agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the Departments of Energy and
Defense, and N.A.S.A. have been placed in charge of this research project that is being developed
for educational purposes and which will be put to the service of private industry. See Patrick J.
Leahy, New Laws for New Technologies: Current Issues Facing the Subcommittee on Technology
and the Law, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (Spring 1992). The NREN is designed to eventually
replace the Internet, which is a loose, decentralized, and enormous web of computers that commu-
nicate with each other through 7,000 computer networks. Kevin Cooke & Dan Lehrer, The In-
ternet: The Whole World Is Talking, THE NATION, July 12, 1993, at 60, 61; Priscilla A. Walter
& Eric H. Sussman, Protecting Commercially Developed Information on the NREN, THE COM-
PUTER LAWYER, Apr. 1993, at 1, 2..
155. Mitchell Kapor, Where Is the Digital Highway Really Heading? The Case for a Jefferso-
nian Information Policy, WIRED, July/Aug. 1993, at 53; John Markoff, Microsoft and 2 Cable
Giants Close to an Alliance, N.Y. TIMES. June 13, 1993, at 1, 31; Herbert I. Schiller, The 'Infor-
mation Highway': Public Way or Private Road?, THE NATION, July 12, 1993, at 64.
156. See Kapor, supra note 155 (discussing the changing alliances in the development of the
"digital highway" and their potential impact).
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rate conglomerates, such as AT&T or Time/Warner, control both
phone and cable lines for the data highway, as is very possible, 57 it
seems likely that such highly concentrated ownership will reduce,
rather than increase, the ability of ordinary citizens to participate in
their political environment, both through suppression of "objectiona-
ble" information and through the necessary decrease in diversity of
information should access to the data highway be controlled by a
few rather than by the many.
The Altai' 58 case illustrates how crucial intellectual property laws
are to any information policies that would apply to a postmodern
"information society" dominated by privately-owned industries. In-
teroperability and open architecture (both in "technical architec-
ture, industry structure, and access to networks"' 159) of computer
systems are key components to any decentralized, grass-roots partic-
ipation in the data highway.' 60 These features would allow small
communities of individuals (e.g., NFL-hating, recovering
shopaholics-who-worship-Star Trek: The Next Generation) to com-
municate with each other through the same cable lines that support
Monday Night Football and the QVC Home Shopping Channel.
Yet we have seen in section I how difficult it is for courts, such as
those in Altai and Sega, to beat back the incentive argument that is
profoundly embedded in standard copyright doctrine. Any attempt
to prevent the interoperability of systems will have the strong semi-
otic grounding of incentive. The courts' inarticulate responses to this
incentive argument illustrate just how important it is to develop a
vocabulary within intellectual property doctrine that is able to ex-
press important countervailing public interests. The danger of mo-
nopoly, the accumulation of knowledge, or even the free use of ideas
are insufficient conceptual constructs. Informed by postmodernism,
the "Progress" project demands a richer lexicon that takes into ac-
157. Cooke & Lehrer, supra note 154, at 62.
158. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); see also supra
notes 50-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Altai opinion).
159. Kapor, supra note 155, at 54. "Interoperability" refers to the ability to use the same
software on different types of hardware or, conversely, many different kinds of software on a
single type of hardware. "Open architecture" is a computer design environment that easily accom-
modates software and hardware components made by different developers.
160. See id. at 54-55; Leahy, supra note 154, at 8-9; Christian H. Nadan & James W.
Morando, Standardization and Interoperability Become Key Factors in Copyright Law, THE
COMPUTER LAWYER, Apr. 1993, at 12; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Industry Groups in Conflict
Over Software Protection, NAT'L L.J.. Apr. 19, 1993, at 17, 20 (describing the American Commit-
tee for Interoperable Systems).
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count the public interest in access to knowledge, in order to retain
and exercise cultural and political control in an environment of an
increasingly private concentration of information.
As Sega'" also demonstrates, doctrine which has developed
around the fair use defense to copyright infringement is affected by
the underlying lack of vision in the modernist tradition's "Progress"
project. Although the fair use defense provides the best statutory
basis for reclaiming the cultural and political values-that are thrown
into relief by postmodern "Progress," the defense is threatened by
the overly-narrow reading that has been accorded to it by some
courts162 and by the continuing effort of certain computer industry
interests to restrict its interpretation even further.' a Copyright law
must be able to articulate why open architecture and interoper-
ability of systems are fundamentally desirable, not as an economic
matter but because they promote grass-roots democracy and a diver-
sity of viewpoints.
Within the lesser developed world, where "bread" issues
predominate, the information "tragedy" stems largely from the dis-
parity in information resources between the developed and develop-
ing worlds"6 4 rather than between the public and private interests.
Technology developed within the context of a highly industrialized
country with predominantly Western values may be exported with
little consideration of its appropriateness for any particular develop-
ing country. 165 A coercive transfer of technology represents a loss of
161. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (accepting the
fair use defense because the defendant had copied the plaintiff's code in order to study the re-
quirements for compatibility).
162. See, e.g., the Sixth Circuit majority's reading in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972
F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993) (holding that the rap
parody is not fair use).
163. See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Laura L.F.H. McDonald, The Fair Use Bill: A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to Congress, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Mar. 1993, at 9 (describing how
some computer industry lobbyists attempted to block the recent amendment to section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, extending the fair use defense to unpublished works).
164. See Tom J. Farer, Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Progress: A Western
Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note
24, at 60, 63-64.
165. C.G. Weeramantry, supra note 24, at 151, 153. Weeramantry notes that:
[A] conscious choice on the part of the recipient country must determine what tech-
nology it will accept or reject. That choice is not purely a scientific one, but depends
upon social and economic factors and the expertise of many disciplines. This becomes
all the more important when we realize that science is essentially a social product.
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control over the conditions of access to knowledge.' 6 6 Conversely,
certain types of technology could be very helpful to the developing
world but are not transferred due to cultural and political differ-
ences regarding the efficacy of intellectual property laws. For exam-
ple, many lesser developed, and even moderately industrialized,
countries refuse to allow pharmaceuticals to be patented. The pri-
mary reason for this is that pharmaceutical prices would then rise,
impeding consumer access to the benefits of this technology. 6 7
Western drug companies view this simply as a denial of fair market
access.' 68 The exclusive focus by the developing world on market
access and market protection delegitimizes concerns of countries
with a relative lack of access to highly specialized knowledge.
Postmodern "Progress" would facilitate decision-making by the de-
veloping world over whether knowledge should be made available,
and if so, on what terms. Knowledge (in particular, the "useful
Arts") is not inevitably good, but must be assessed in relation to
other needs. Thus, a highly industrialized country that needs access
to technology in order to increase market share in other highly in-
dustrialized countries should have a higher standard of intellectual
property protection than would a less developed country that needs
access to technology in order to provide basic health care services.
Again, this type of "Progress" differs fundamentally from the con-
cept of inexorable advancement of knowledge that is over-repre-
sented in the concept of "Progress" developed via the modernist tra-
dition.' 9 In a postmodern reading of "Progress," the copyright and
patent power is interpreted against a complex context of disparities
in control over knowledge rather than simply against the provision
of incentives to inventors.
Can a modern "Progress" that is aware of its flawed assumptions,
166. Id. at 153-56.
167. D.C. JAYASURIYA, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LE-
GAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES 79-80 (WHO 1985).
168. See Arthur Wineburg, U.S. Trade Threats Spur Asian Laws on Intellectual Property,
NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 29.
169. See Weeramantry, supra note 24, at 156 ("In other words, there has to be a break from
the deterministic theory regarding technology which holds that technology runs an inevitable
course and that it cannot be resisted as it has a motive force of its own."). Article 27 of the
Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that "[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits," although it goes on to state "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(II), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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or a postmodern "Progress," reinscribe meaning into the copyright
and patent power? The prospect of postmodern "Progress" is uncer-
tain. Knowledge has numerous effects, both good and bad. Even as-
suming the death of the modernist tradition (which, according to
some postmodernists themselves, is greatly exaggerated), 7 ' "Pro-
gress" is not a concept devoid of utopian content. Knowledge holds
for humans the idea of renewability; unlike natural resources,
knowledge cannot be depleted through use. Knowledge, moreover,
has a reflexive as well as increasingly saturated relationship to
human social practices that makes access to it a necessary compo-
nent of human freedom. The iterative effects of postmodern knowl-
edge are not always within our control. Nonetheless, since "the
chronic revision of social practices in the light of knowledge about
those practices is part of the very tissue of modern institutions,
even-handed access to knowledge is a prerequisite for democratic
decision-making. Knowledge, as the Framers recognized (and as
postmodernists affirm), is an important tool (act). It has a libera-
tionist role within a tragically aware modern or even postmodern
"Progress. "172
III. ORIGINALITY AND INTENT
Ironically, the works of two Framers of the Constitution closely
associated with the copyright and patent power - James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson - give us a textual basis (or if you prefer, a
postmodern act) that links the Enlightenment to the postmodern
"Progress" project. 173 Although knowledge was certainly essential to
170. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 14, at 1248. Schlag notes that:
[T]he cognitive orientations that dominate judge-made law are largely prerationalism
and rationalism. Now, in one sense, this can seem very amusing: law apparently is one
field in which twentieth century thought can routinely encounter the thought of the
eighteenth and lose . . . frequently. But in another sense, this is not amusing at all -
. . . it is eighteenth century conceptions - conceptions of responsibility, of agency, of
harm, of language and meaning itself - that continue to rule the decisions of a late
twentieth century technological society. Such a state of affairs is at once an intellec-
tual embarrassment and a form of violence.
Id.
171. GIDDENS. supra note 3, at 40.
172. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
173. In doing so, I note that I am relying heavily on historical records of the most exclusionary
kind, at least in the United States: intellectual history of white males. However, my purpose is not
to reconstruct a "truer" version of history but merely to unearth one of many past perspectives so
as to bring a fresh "insight, reminder, and argument" into the problem of knowledge and prop-
erty. See Laura S. Underkufiler, The Perfidy of Property, 70 TEX. L. REV. 293, 305 n.87 (1991)
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the Enlightenment project of progress, the relation of knowledge to
the other constituent elements of the constitutional framework (life,
liberty, happiness, property) is not resolved in the constitutional text
itself, just as the relationship among these other elements was left
unresolved.174 In light of the Enlightenment emphasis on the capac-
ity of the intellect in general, and the utility of facts and scientific
observation in particular, both Madison's and Jefferson's ideas on
property indicate that access to knowledge might be a fundamental
civil right, and freedom to apply that knowledge to a specific task a
fundamental civil liberty. Identifying these strains within their work
not only gives more depth to the modern views of progress, but also
underscores the availability of the constitutional text for postmodern
progress.
A. Madison's Views
As Jennifer Nedelsky writes, it was not possession or use of prop-
erty that was the starting point for Madison's discussion of property
rights, but rather something quite different:
Madison's claim for the priority of property in The Federalist, No. 10, is
very special and precise: the first object of government is the protection of
"the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate," namely,
"the different and unequal faculties of acquiring property." . . . But what
did it mean to protect "the different and unequal faculties of acquiring
property?"' m
Madison's 1792 article on property gives us an insight: "[Man] has
an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of
the objects on which to employ them." '176 Moreover, it "is not a just
government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restric-
tions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that
free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations,
(book review) [hereinafter Underkuffier, Perfidy of Property] (quoting JEREMY WALDRON, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 136 (1988)). But see Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1037 (1981) (noting that the "resigned" variety of historical
scholarship recognizes that textual interpretation is historically contingent - but hey, "that's
life.").
174. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 5-6 (1990); cf. BOORSTIN, supra note
103, at 194 (stating that for Jeffersonians, a "list of 'rights' substituted for a systematic theory of
government.").
175. NEDELSKY, supra note 174, at 28-29.
176. James Madison, Property, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 102 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1906) [hereinafter MADISON, WRITINGS] (emphasis added).
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which . . . are the means of acquiring property.' 17 7 In the context
of the Enlightenment faith, Madison could very well have meant, by
"free use of . . . faculties," the freedom of a person's intellect and
creativity. That is, freedom to have and to use ideas, to apprehend
the world of which she is a part, and to put the resulting knowledge
to use. 178 Laura Underkuffier claims Madison's "broader under-
standing of property . . . includ[ed] rights to freedom of conscience,
freedom of expression, physical liberty, and the ability to use one's
intelligence and creative powers, [which] is radically different from
the ordinary understanding of property today."' 79
Madison would accord the free exercise of intellect and creativity
privileged status as property, 8 ' as well as the fruits of that free ex-
ercise. He wrote, "In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights."''
Madison's conception of freedom to use knowledge seems radically
different from the current legal construct of intellectual property. At
the same time, this conception is very consistent with the
postmodern view of knowledge as a constitutive act. That is, it is the
individual's ability to use knowledge to gain property, rather than
the individual's ability to protect knowledge already gained, that
Madison sought to protect (as property) in the first instance. Under
this view, freedom to gain knowledge and to apply that knowledge
to useful ends would be a fundamental civil liberty.
Is there an inconsistency in Madison's simultaneous acknowledge-
ment of property as knowledge and knowledge as property? For
many reasons, I do not believe that any inconsistency (even assum-
ing it existed) is problematic. Neither Madison nor Jefferson (who I
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Laura Underkuffler interprets the "free use of ... faculties" as many aspects of a prop-
erty right. This understanding can be traced back to seventeenth century Whig idealogy, in which
these aspects of property were viewed as "natural rights which appertain to man, the protection of
which was the chief object of the state's existence." Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An
Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 137 (1990) (citing CASIMAR J. CZAJKOWSKi, THE THEORY OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 23 n.62 (1941)).
179. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
180. In discussing the historical "comprehensive approach" to property shared by Locke,
Madison, and others, Underkuffler states:
By distinctly tying the broad range of human rights contained within the concept of
property to the development of human personality, the comprehensive approach not
only assumes a collective role in the definition or limitation of individual property
rights, but also assumes a collective context for their exercise and realization.
Id. at 140.
181. Id. at 135 (quoting 6 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 176, at 101).
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will discuss below) had a unified narrative of intellectual property
that a reason-demanding modernist might want as an ultimate ver-
ification of knowledge. But postmodernism does not demand consis-
tency, and in fact expects and exalts inconsistency as being a defin-
ing characteristic of a more authentic form of knowledge. The
rationalist's insistence on an internally logical, consistent narrative
of Madison's thoughts on intellectual property is' simply irrelevant to
a postmodernist.
Moreover, any inconsistency between intellectual property as ac-
cess to knowledge and as the protection of the fruits of one's intel-
lect seems to be inscribed in the copyright and patent clause itself
- and this is precisely what postmodern theory (in particular, the
practice of deconstruction) shows. Scholars have inferred from
Madison's The Federalist No. 43,182 and from the fact that he intro-
duced the copyright clause into the proceedings of the Constitu-
tional Convention, a commitment only to the latter definition of
property.18 3 Yet both texts suggest with equal persuasion that
Madison was prepared to allow inconsistent conceptualizations of
intellectual property. The copyright and patent clause does not au-
thorize incentives to all inventors and authors for any concepts, but
only to those who would "promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts." As discussed above, the text does not decide for us how to
determine whether the grant of patent or copyright would encourage
knowledge, and for what end.
Similarly, The Federalist No. 43 states with respect to the patent
and copyright clause that "[tihe public good fully coincides . . . with
the claims of individuals." '84 In a postmodern framework, this asser-
tion does not necessarily contradict Madison's definition of property
as inhering in access to information, because the ambiguity in the
182. After conclusionally stating "The utility of this power [of Congress with regard to patents
and copyrights] will scarcely be questioned," he states, "The public good fully coincides in both
cases with the claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961).
183. Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17
GEO. LJ. 109, 112-13 (1929). Madison introduced a set of proposals on August 18, 1787, which
included provisions authorizing the national legislature "[to secure to literary authors their copy
rights for a limited time" and "[tjo encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries." BUGBEE. supra note 7, at 126. Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina proposed a slightly different set. Id. The Convention referred both proposals to the Com-
mittee on Detail, which then drafted a clause which is virtually identical to the present clause. Id.
at 126, 129.
184. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 182, at 272.
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text is something to be explored rather than resolved. But to satisfy
a modernist, any such inconsistency may have been deliberate be-
cause as a matter of rhetorical (and ultimately political) strategy,
Madison claimed repeatedly throughout the Federalist papers that
there is no contradiction between simultaneously maximizing self-
interest and the public good. 18 5
Another possible modernist reason for this apparent inconsistency,
and one about which Madison could not have been self-conscious, is
that the subject matter of the early copyright statutes was so narrow
so as not to threaten access to knowledge, 186 and therefore did not
threaten his and John Locke's tenet that property ownership
"leave[s] to every one else the like advantage."'81 7 The current copy-
right statute, by contrast, covers not only textual works such as
books, but works that can only exist now because of the develop-
ment of communications technology - works such as sound record-
ings, motion pictures, and screen displays of computers. Further-
more, with respect to patentable subject matter, at least, Madison
may have viewed the freedom to use one's intellect as a right deriv-
ing from natural law and, at the same time, approved of patent
grants by the state.188 Under this interpretation, the property right
in the free use of one's faculties would be the primary or preexisting
185. Meyer posits and answers the following question:
How may self-interest and the public good both be given maximum protection? . . .
First, on the moral and rhetorical level, The Federalist makes a moral appeal to all
Americans to transcend narrow self-interest and rise to the cause of the 'public good,'
addressing itself to the good sense and the patriotism of the American people. Second,
on what may be called the mechanical level, The Federalist demonstrates how the
new Constitution provides a form of government that counterbalances private inter-
ests, protects basic rights, and ensures social order, thus showing that a political soci-
ety can be intelligently engineered to achieve maximum moral efficiency.
MEYER. supra note 97, at 160-61.
186. The scope of the copyright statutes that existed in the United States and England between
1783-1786 was quite narrow compared to the subject matter embraced by the Copyright Act of
1976. At that time, such statutes generally only covered books. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1951) (noting that all but one of the states had
copyright statutes, but only Connecticut and North Carolina covered maps and charts in addition
to books). The Virginia Copyright Act introduced by Madison granted copyrights to authors for
their books for a term of twenty-one years. BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 121-22.
187. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 131, in Two TREATISES OF Gov-
ERNMENT 353 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988).
188. The question of whether copyright was a creation of the state, rather than a natural right
appurtenant to authors, had been answered in the affirmative in England but not in the United
States by the time Madison wrote THE FEDERALIST No. 43. See Donaldson v. Beckett, I Eng.
Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774). That question was resolved in this country in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591, 661 (1834).
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT POWER
right.
Finally, both Madison and Jefferson occasionally associated copy-
right and patent with other, more despised forms of monopoly. In a
letter to Jefferson written soon after the constitutional convention
ended, Madison expressed some ambivalence with respect to the
granting of copyrights and patents:
With regard to Monopolies, they are justly classed among the greatest nui-
sances in Government. But is it clear that as encouragements to literary
works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly re-
nounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the public to
abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of it?189
As will be seen below, Jefferson occasionally shared the same senti-
ments. Madison's later essay on property again clearly signals his
mistrust of sovereign power in the form of "arbitrary restrictions,
exemptions, and monopolies."'90
Regardless of whether access to or restrictions on the use of
knowledge is the more fundamental property right, Madison did not
have an egalitarian view of the consequences of freedom of intellect
and creativity. He acknowledged freedom of intellect and creativity
would not necessarily lead to an equal or just distribution of prop-
erty. Although freedom of intellect is an aspect of property in its
"larger and juster meaning,"' 91 Madison equated this aspect with
the concept of inequality. In Federalist No. 10, Madison conveyed,
in the words of Underkuffler, that "It is the exercise of diverse, indi-
vidual faculties which is the source of unequal distributions of prop-
erty.' 92 Madison apparently believed that although each person
was free to exercise his or her intellect, such freedom did not guar-
189. BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 130 (quoting 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 176, at 274-75).
190. NEDELSKY. supra note 174, at 29. This reference to monopolies could be to the long his-
tory of the sovereign simultaneously granting a monopoly of publication to specific printers for the
exclusive right of publishing books, in exchange for their suppression and censorship of certain
publications. KAPLAN, supra note 105, at 3-4; see also BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 44, 46, 50 (dis-
cussing Venetian and English efforts to control publishing). The English system of patent monopo-
lies did not have the same history of abuse by the sovereign. The granting of patents was discre-
tionary, but were not limited to specific groups of inventors. See Edward Armitage, Two Hundred
Years of English Patent Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT.
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 4 (1977). But both copyright and patents were closely
associated with other forms of state monopolies. BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 35, 50.
191. Underkuffler, Perfidy of Property, supra note 173, at 135 ("in its larger and juster mean-
ing, [property] embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and
which leaves to every one else the like advantage.") (quoting 6 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note
176, at 101) (emphasis in original).
192. 6 MADISON. WRITINGS, supra note 176, at 134.
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antee an equality of result. The resulting unequal distributions of
property might lead to factionalism within the republic, but
Madison felt that consequence was inevitable given that the first ob-
ject of government was to protect these different and unequal facul-
ties of acquisition. His thinking about property may have been influ-
enced by Locke, who can be read to endorse a "just deserts" basis
for property rights. 93
B. Jefferson's Views
Jefferson's letters and diaries reflect both an implicit rejection of
a Lockean justification for intellectual property qua property as well
as a quintessentially Enlightenment optimism in progress.1 94 Rather
than being meted and bounded like an acre of land of which the
fruits of one's labor justifies the ownership, the invention that is the
outcome of an idea does not inevitably enjoy protection. There is
something different about ideas and their progeny, inventions. Jef-
ferson wrote that:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give
an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to
men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be
done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or
complaint from anybody. Accordingly, it is a fact, as far as I am informed,
that England was, until we copied her, the only country on earth which ever,
by a general law, gave a legal right to the exclusive use of an idea. In some
other countries it is sometimes done, in a great case, and by a special and
personal act, but, generally speaking, other nations have thought that these
monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society; and it
may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of invention, are
as fruitful as England in new and useful devices.'95
The "encouragement" of which Jefferson spoke, the incentive justifi-
193. "The Whig view of property found its most articulate and influential spokesman in John
Locke. Locke's views exerted a powerful influence on the American Founders and on the early
years of.American jurisprudence." Id. at 138.
194. Jefferson wrote:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expan-
sible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) [hereinafter Jefferson-Mc-
Pherson Letter], reprinted in Kurland & Lerner, supra note 13, at 42..
195. Jefferson-McPherson Letter, supra note 194, at 42-43.
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cation for protection of certain types of knowledge, resembles
Locke's theory that property is a reward for labor. 9 ' But in 1813,
Jefferson clearly did not see the patent or copyright as being a natu-
ral right; rather he viewed it as a fungible right which was within
the state's discretion to grant.' 97
Jefferson the scientist and diplomat was all too aware that "the
more America cut herself off from the Old World, the more she lost
the necessary means of scientific progress."' 98 Protectionism and iso-
lationism retarded, not encouraged, scientific progress. A clue to
Jefferson's attitude toward restrictions on knowledge can be gleaned
from his obsession, while a diplomat to France, with investigating
agriculture that could be transplanted to America. This led him
even to "smuggle[] a sack of rice out of Lombardy, despite the fact
there was a penalty of death for anyone caught taking it out of the
country."' 99 The spread of ideas and inventions was of a higher pri-
ority to Jefferson than was the obeyance. of laws that restricted the
spread of those ideas and inventions.200
Jefferson implied that the same encouragement to authors and in-
ventors might be provided through a system of financial rewards. In
fact, Madison's proposals to the Constitutional convention included
a measure "[t]o encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries. "'20 The Ameri-
can Philosophical Society, the "leading American scientific society
both before and after the American Revolution,"2 2 engaged in a
196. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 296-330
(1988) (using Locke's theory of property to justify intellectual property).
197. Like Madison, Jefferson was not consistent in this view that freedom of access to knowl-
edge was never to be relinquished to other property rights. Compare Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43, 47 (Paul
L. Ford ed., 1895) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, WRITINGS], with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789) in 5 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra at 107, 113 (demonstrating
Jefferson's changing views on the necessity of monopolies).
198. MAY. supra note 94, at 218.
199. Sagar, Introduction to JEFFERSON'S TRAVEL DIARIES, supra note 109, at 12.
200. Meyer states:
Ideas are more easily imported than objects and institutions. Because of this, the
Americans absorbed many eighteenth-century ideas while possessing few of the insti-
tutions, artifacts, and conventions that gave them special meaning. While this im-
posed obvious limitations on the American mind, it also presented Americans with
special opportunities. Institutions hamper ideas as well as sustain them, and their in-
stitutional shortcomings allowed the Americans, almost without thinking about it, to
put many of their imported ideas to work without opposition.
MEYER. supra note 97, at xx-xxi.
201. Records of the Federal Convention, in 3 Kurland & Lerner, supra note 13, at 40.
202. MAY. supra note 94, at 84.
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private reward system for various useful discoveries and inven-
tions,2 °3 as did some of the states prior to the formation of the re-
public.20 4 Indeed, Jefferson suggests governmental encouragement
might be withheld altogether.20 5
Perhaps Jefferson's reluctance to classify inventions as a type of
property can be attributed, in retrospect, to his underestimation of
the ability of property law to accommodate new forms of prop-
erty.20 6 Certainly we know he partially relented from this reluctance
as early as 1788,207 for he served as one of the first commissioners
administering the Patent Act of 1790.208 Nonetheless, his writings
suggest there is a different aspect to an idea than there is to mere
property.
Why are ideas so wonderful? Jefferson linked them to "the moral
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condi-
tion."20 9 Thus, like many Enlightenment-era intellectuals, he ap-
pears to have thought of ideas instrumentally, valuable because of
their potential for improvement of human existence. 210 His measure-
ment of that value might have been similar to what we term today
sustainable development - a measure that includes the distribu-
tional as well as sheer growth aspects of progress.211 In that sense,
203. Id. at 217.
204. BUGBEE, supra note 7, at 84-103.
205. Even England, "fruitful . . . in new and useful devices," did not grant patents as a matter
of right. In the mid-eighteenth century the royal grant of a patent was discretionary to an ex-
treme. Armitage, supra note 190, at 4 (citing Jefferson-McPherson Letter, supra note 194, at 43).
206. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: the Development
of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980). But Jefferson recognized that
even ownership of real property was a social construct rather than a natural right. He wrote:
"Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of society." Jefferson-
McPherson Letter, supra note 197, at 42.
207. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, '1788), in 5 JEFFERSON. WRIT-
INGS supra note 176, at 43, 47.
208. BUGBEE. supra note 7, at 149.
209. Jefferson-McPherson Letter, supra note 194, at 42.
210. "The history of human progress from the Jeffersonian point of view was thus 'the history
of the condition of man.' Man's condition could and would be improved. But under American
circumstances it was hard to distinguish improvement from expansion, progress from enlarge-
ment." BOORSTIN. supra note 103, at 225. "When the Jeffersonians spoke of 'happiness' it was
• . . in such phrases as 'the happiness of the species' or 'the happiness of mankind' which signified
material prosperity and survival power." Id. at 53.
211. His European Travel Diaries, for example, record what might seem a random mix of
observations of soil, air temperature, water, geological formations, crops, social organizations,
clothing, food, and wine quality. But he was attentive to the differential impact of agricultural
knowledge and technology on a people's standard of living (for example, red grape growers as
opposed to white; women as opposed to men):
At Pommard and Volnay I observed (laborers) eating good wheat bread; at Meur-
[Vol. 43:97
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he may have been different from Madison. 12
But one might also read into his reluctance to impose restrictions
in knowledge the notion that he valued the freedom to acquire
knowledge as a fundamental right. Thus Jefferson's views, like those
of Madison, provide a link between modern and postmodern pro-
gress. The Enlightenment as faith required human beings to observe
and record clues about the natural world, and deduce from this evi-
dence ways to improve humankind. Thus ideas - the vehicle of this
faith - should be minimally restricted. Postmodern progress em-
phasizes the practices of individuals that are also highly dependent
on free access to knowledge as a means of performing knowledge.
Returning to the text of the Constitution, the "Progress of Sci-
ence and Useful Arts" is to be promoted by Congress. 13 The subse-
quent language of incentive in the copyright and patent clause ob-
scures the starting premise that access to knowledge is a type of
property right.214 Madison and Jefferson recognized, if inconsis-
tently, this other side of intellectual property. Knowledge - the
outcome of human beings exerting their "faculties" upon the natu-
ral world - is something all citizens can freely attain and of which
they should have free use.
The modernist treats knowledge as a means of rationally progres-
sive improvement of human conditions. Knowledge is an integral
component of progress, as well as a result of progress. With respect
to the goals of the Constitution, knowledge assists in promoting lib-
erty and happiness. It does so directly by enlightening citizens. It
does so indirectly by freeing them from certain tangible restraints
such as hunger, homelessness, etc. Congress promotes the "Progress
sault, rye. I asked the reason of this difference. They told me that the white wines fail
in quality much more often than the red and remain on hand. The farmer therefore
cannot afford to feed his laborer so well. At Meursault only white wines are made
because there is too much stone for the red. On such slight circumstances depends the
condition of man!
JEFFERSON'S TRAVEL DIARIES, supra note 109, at 41.
212. Nedelsky notes an interchange between Jefferson and Madison regarding property that
suggests Jefferson was not wedded to existing property distributions. NEDELSKY, supra note 174,
at 32-33. But Boorstin doubts that Jefferson was concerned with distributional aspects of property.
BOORSTIN. supra note 103, at 199. Meyer writes that "[t]he ideal Jeffersonian state would liberate
the active intellect as well as the entrepreneurial initiative, but it would do little to encourage or
compensate those in whom years of social injustice arrested the intellect or destroyed initiative."
MEYER, supra note 97, at 123.
213. US. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
214. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .. " Id.
1993]
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of Science and useful Arts" because knowledge is fundamental to
progress: to bread, knowledge, freedom. However, a modern "Pro-
gress" read in light of both Madison's and Jefferson's views on intel-
lectual property requires not just that incentives be provided to au-
thors and inventors to increase knowledge, but that each human
being have the right to use that knowledge.215
Postmodern "Progress" is also premised on knowledge but seeks a
different relationship to it. Progress is an inevitability, but neither
an ever-advancing one nor a rationally induced or deduced one.
Knowledge is an act, which may or may not be expressive of pro-
gress. Postmodern "Progress," to the extent it is definable a priori,
occurs through the acts of knowledge as well as other acts per-
formed by contingently-situated individuals. More importantly, it
acknowledges the consequences of disparity in control over knowl-
edge and technology. It attends to the saturation of culture by me-
dia technology, and ensures that individuals are free to respond to
media images. Madison and Jefferson's notions of free access to
knowledge encourage the performance of these responses, which in
turn perform the copyright and patent clause.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS
If one agrees with the Altai outcome, or more generally with the
premise that intellectual property rights regimes should be struc-
tured so as to secure access to knowledge by all, then, afortiori, one
must believe that this is the best way to promote some end. "Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts", as I have argued, was essential to
the Enlightenment-influenced optimism in progress. I have sketched
how this view necessarily relied on the creative and intellectual fac-
ulties of individuals, and ergo access to a commons of ideas. This
vision of knowledge within our political, economic, and social struc-
ture has been largely obscured.
In brushing off the modernist vision of knowledge, we face its lim-
its. We have seen the future envisioned by the Enlightenment, and it
is not utopian. In some senses, Jocasta had the right impulse. Pro-
215. KAPLAN. supra note 105, at 2. He writes:
[l1f man has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows,
and thus to reap where he has not sown. Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of
mimicry, and "progress," if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indul-
gence of copying.
[Vol. 43:97
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gress - if by that we mean improvement of the human condition -
has let us down.
But progress is inevitable, even if it is not necessarily forward in
motion or positive in effect. Instead we have the postmodernist age,
stemming from the radically restructured capitalism that is charac-
teristic of the late twentieth century; "on the one hand, . . . a way
of operating or a style (e.g., of art, architecture, protest, or scholar-
ship) that we can, through an act of will, decide to cast off; on the
other hand, . . . [a] condition of life to which we are shackled."21
Whether viewed by a modernist or postmodernist, knowledge is
still a key to progress. We must clarify to what end we are progress-
ing because "the value - or, rather, power - of knowledge lies not
in its mere possession,.but in the range of possible uses and users for
it."12 17 The patent and copyright clause is, as ever, instrumental.
However, we cannot decide how to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts" before we have debated the terms of progress. An
idea of progress that rejects sheer material growth as its sine qua
non changes the focus of our intellectual property laws from compe-
tition policy to the complicated interface between science and
society.
Because the copyright and patent clause is so clearly instrumental
in tone, we tend to forget that the grant of a copyright or a patent is
an exception. When we explore the question to which it is an excep-
tion, we see that competition and innovation are not the only or even
the primary mandates of that clause. Access to knowledge as an
essential component of liberty is the "thing" to which a patent and
copyright is an exception. The Altai court, with this understanding,
may have been able to articulate a justification for its opinion that
could rely on the strong conceptual pull that "free use of faculties,"
as a type of property right (and as a type of civil right), could exert.
It would have been able to expand the public domain to more than
just the undefined third prong of a test into a much more powerful
concept: A commons of knowledge held in stewardship by the courts
and guarded by them against over-appropriation. Computer
software development pierces the seeming inevitability of knowledge
protection because, as the Altai court inchoately recognized, the
right kind of software development depends much on keeping large
216. Ewick, supra note 133, at 756.
217. Steve Fuller, Studying the Proprietary Grounds of Knowledge, in To HAVE POSSESSIONS:
A HANDBOOK ON OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY 105, 109 (Floyd W. Rudmin ed., 1991).
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portions of knowledge in the a trust accessible to everyone - a
commons of information. Thus, the "Progress of useful Arts" in this
case cannot be encouraged by copyright, because progress (larger,
but with a small "p") would be impeded.
The project of the patent and copyright clause must be under-
stood as access to knowledge, which is a type of property and civil
right. Copyrightable subject matter encompasses far more than
books written by learned men, and patents cover far more than de-
vices deriving from Newtonian physics. All areas of federal intellec-
tual property are blending into each other;218 the subject matter of
intellectual property, rather than knowledge itself, seems "expansi-
ble over all space. ' 219 Free use of one's faculties and the free choice
of objects upon which to exert them - Madison's vision - could
challenge Madison Avenue's version of a democratic society.
218. See, e.g., Atari Games v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("If
the patentable process [protected by Title 35] is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line instruc-
tions of the computer program ... then the process merges with the expression [protected by
Title 17] and precludes copyright protection."); Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the misuse of copyright is a valid defense to a copyright infringement
action); Michael T. Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence
of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 623 (1992) ("Courts have merged, in an unprecedented fashion, the different intellectual
property laws that protect against unauthorized use of [fictional literary and pictorial charac-
ters]."); Stephanie Strom, Enlisting the Copyright Law In Battling the 'Gray Market', N.Y.
TIMES. July 21, 1992, at DI (reporting a fragrance company's use of copyright rather than trade-
mark law to protect the distribution of its products).
These same insights can be applied to other branches of intellectual property. Trademarks have
become expressive of things other than manufacturing source and have strong cultural compo-
nents. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language In the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990). See generally Coombe, Objects of Prop-
erty, supra note 120, at 1880. In the area of trade secrets, public interests such as health and
environmental concerns might take precedence over the right of innovators. See Mary L. Lyndon,
Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. REV. 1, 55 (1993) (arguing that
"[tirade secrecy doctrines ... should not be applied to health and environmental information" in
the developed world).
219. Jefferson-McPherson Letter, supra note 194, at 42.
